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This paper compares and contrasts the economies of Ireland and New
Zealand.  It attempts to identify important factors behind Ireland’s recent strong
growth, and seeks to derive ‘lessons’ for New Zealand.  It is suggested that
Ireland has benefited from its location, openness, macroeconomic stability,
favourable demographics, educated population, wage moderation, foreign
investment, European Union transfers, and luck!  From a New Zealand
viewpoint, the Irish experience reiterates the significance of quality investment,
education and human capital, and macroeconomic stability and openness.  But
given the differences between the two countries, caution should be exercised in
applying specific Irish policies in New Zealand.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the New Zealand Treasury.  The Treasury
takes no responsibility for any errors or omissions in, or for the
correctness of, the information contained in these working papers.Summary
Motivation
Since the mid-1980’s Ireland has undergone a transformation.  The economy is
now one of the top performers in the OECD.  GDP growth averaged 5.4% pa
between 1987-96, with particularly high growth after 1993.  Earlier, Ireland had
spent its way into severe economic difficulties, with low growth, huge debt, and
large and growing government and current account deficits.  The scenario
seems very familiar; indeed, New Zealand and Ireland do share some important
characteristics regarding their experiences with economic crisis and subsequent
reform.  Not only this, but Ireland and New Zealand also have very similar
country characteristics such as size, population, and an agricultural
background.  Despite the similarities though, New Zealand has experienced
somewhat different results from the reform process.  Even though reforming
more intensely New Zealand only managed to average around 2% GDP growth
between 1987-96.  The differing growth rates meant that while Ireland’s GDP
per capita was only 65% of New Zealand’s in 1985, by 1995 it had risen to
108% according to OECD statistics.  The motivation for this study is quite clear
￿ given the similarities between Ireland and New Zealand, can we learn
anything from their performance that could help us achieve higher growth rates?
This summary outlines the main sections of the paper.  A table of main
economic indicators can be found on page 13.
Contributions to Growth
Before looking at particular areas of the economy and the government’s policy
stances, Ireland’s actual growth is decomposed into contributions from labour,
capital and total factor productivity in the context of growth accounting.  The
decomposition suggests that Ireland’s TFP contribution to growth equaled 59%
over the period 1970-96, which is above average compared with studies of
other countries.  Ireland experienced average annual TFP growth of 2.4% over
the period, with labour growth of 0.55% and capital growth of 1.16%.  These
figures contrast sharply with New Zealand, where average annual TFP growth
was 0.83%, labour growth was 1.23% and capital growth was 0.22%.  While
Ireland was converging to OECD levels at a slower than expected rate between
1945-88, it seems certain that it is now converging at a faster rate as its growth
has accelerated.  The question is whether this convergence may have been
assisted by policy.  There is also a question as to how much growth was
assisted by the use of previously unemployed resources.2
Sectoral Growth
As would be expected in a modernising economy the agricultural sector has
experienced a decline, both in terms of output and exports as percentages of
total output and exports.  Even so, employment is still at relatively high levels as
compared to New Zealand, as employment has been artificially sustained by EU
transfers.  It is notable that New Zealand exports still comprise a large amount
of agricultural products, while Ireland has moved away from this reliance.
Industry has assumed a greater role in Ireland, accounting for nearly 40% of
GDP and over 75% of exports.  The activities of foreign firms have been the
driving force behind this manufacturing growth, with the Irish government being
most encouraging.
Monetary Policy
Ireland seems to have a number of goals for monetary policy which have luckily
remained collectively feasible, meaning that Ireland has not had to make too
many tough decisions in the monetary policy arena recently.  Inflation is the
stated main objective of the Irish Central Bank, and they have succeeded in
bringing inflation down, to hover within a stable band of around 2-4% since the
mid-1980’s.  Membership of the ERM and the fiscal consolidation in the 1980’s
assisted in achieving this.  The Central Bank also seeks to smooth temporary
and predictable fluctuations in interest rates.  Long term interest rates are
converging to German levels as would be expected under the EMS regime.
New Zealand too has low and stable inflation, but the experience with interest
rates has been much more volatile.  In addition, the behaviour of real exchange
rates differs markedly between the two countries.  While Ireland has had a
rather stable real exchange rate, with movement since 1984 being within a 16
percentage point band, New Zealand has had much wilder fluctuations, with a
similarly measured band being about 36 percentage points wide.  Ireland may
be extracting this stability from EMS membership, but there are benefits of a
stable exchange rate for investment.  New Zealand has not been so fortunate.
Fiscal Policy
Reducing Ireland’s net debt was a priority for the government, and the figure is
now falling as a percentage of GDP.  However, this seems to be mainly
because of the strong growth in GDP, rather than dedicated fiscal prudence and
repayment.  The government has generally run a deficit, although there was a
small surplus in the last financial year.  Maastricht will restrict their ability to let
any deficits widen at any point in time.  Tax and spending as a percentage of
GDP are quite high ￿ generally over 40%.  This contrasts with New Zealand,
which has kept below 40% and is trying to achieve 30% for expenditure.  There
are suggestions that Ireland has cut expenditure by just enough to meet the3
Maastricht criteria, and that underlying structural issues have yet to be
addressed.  New Zealand on the other hand, has made significant changes at
the structural level.  Perhaps strong growth has enabled Ireland to put off
making hard decisions with regard to further reforms.
Most of the categories of revenue and expenditure are fairly similar between
Ireland and New Zealand, except for Ireland’s higher expenditure on debt
financing costs and New Zealand’s higher expenditure on social security and
welfare.  Ireland also has a large source of revenue in their Supply Services
Receipts (social security levies).  It is interesting that Ireland has a higher level
of government involvement in the economy and is growing at such high rates ￿
as suggested, perhaps high growth is masking the need to cut back government
expenditure.
Tax policy is complicated, and distortionary due to the systems of allowances
and selective taxation.  There is also a complex system for pay-related social
insurance.  In general, personal average and marginal tax rates are high;  in
1996 Ireland’s average tax rate was 28.6% and its highest marginal rate was
55.8%.  In contrast, New Zealand’s average tax rate was 19.14%, with the top
marginal tax rate being 33%.  In Ireland though, there are substantial clawbacks
which effectively reduce the marginal tax rate, although these are highly
distortionary.  Reforms are underway, with the 1998 Irish Budget announcing
tax cuts for most classes.  Notably the 10% tax rate for specific trading
activities, predominantly manufacturing, will not be altered until 2010 when the
current legislation expires.  At that point the rate will increase slightly to 12.5%,
although they may face pressure from the EU to align with other member
countries.
Asset sales have not featured as prominently in Ireland’s history as they have in
New Zealand’s, with sales of state-owned firms representing 0.3% of Ireland’s
GDP between 1988-92, compared with 3.6% for New Zealand.
The effect of the system of wage moderation, brought about by the national pay
agreements, is unclear.  It seemed to work, at least in the public sector, from
1987 to the early 1990’s.  However, there is now increasing pressure on the
agreements as workers demand higher settlements while at the same time the
Government is being urged to restrain overall spending and wages.
Foreign Direct Investment
There has been a reasonably long history of openness in Ireland.  Since the late
1950’s FDI has been actively attracted into the country, with a special agency
(the IDA) set up and charged with drawing it in.  The incentives for FDI are
large, diverse, and it would seem, effective.  It is worth noting however, that this
policy’s success has only been apparent in the last decade or so.  This possibly
reflects some sort of virtuous circle, with other policy areas lending their
support.4
FDI has reached levels of around 3% of GDP in recent years, and there have
been generally steady inflows.  The majority of the investment is greenfield and
export-oriented, with around half of the flows stemming from the USA.  Other
European countries also invest, suggesting that EU market penetration is not
the overriding reason for investment in Ireland.  Half of the employment and
over 75% of the output of the industrial sector is attributable to foreign firms.
Workers in foreign firms are generally more highly skilled, and are paid more.
Real earnings have been rising, and the average manufacturing wage now
exceeds that in New Zealand.
The IDA targets industries to attract to Ireland, including electronics,
engineering, healthcare, consumer products, financial services, and
international services.  These industries are targeted for their potential for
transferring skills and technology, and for their job creation effects.  Additionally
there is an International Financial Services Centre and a special export zone
(Shannon Free Airport).
While Irish firms have received more encouragement recently, the incentives for
FDI are still enormous.  These include:
• tax incentives ￿ the tax rate on profits is only 10% (to be converted to 12.5%
by 2003);
• grants ￿ including cash for capital, training, employment, research and
development, and feasibility studies;  and
• provision of office and building sites, and the construction of factories and
offices.
There is evidence to suggest though, that FDI is squeezing out domestic
entrepreneurship, with people finding it more profitable to work for a foreign firm
than to start up a business of their own.
The contrast between the Irish Government policies and the New Zealand
Government policies is fairly stark.  While Ireland has an interventionist stance,
New Zealand maintains a ‘hands-off’ policy.  In addition, the type of investment
in New Zealand is quite different, with direct investment mainly involving the
purchase of firms which are domestic market oriented.
Savings and Investment
For the total economy in Ireland the balance between savings and investment
has turned from negative to positive since 1987-88, reflected in the movement
to a current account surplus.  This was by virtue of falling investment levels with
relatively stable savings.  New Zealand’s investment figures have generally
been above those of Ireland, in recent years by around 5 percentage points.
Savings does not differ a lot between the two countries, although at present
Ireland exceeds New Zealand by about 2 percentage points.  Despite the
decline in Irish investment there has still been economic growth, to the
astonishment of some Irish academics.  The reason for this, it has been5
suggested, it that inefficient public sector investment has fallen while foreign
direct investment has risen.  This FDI generates substantial flows of high value-
added exports.  This raises important questions about the quality of investment.
Current Account
As stated, the current account in Ireland is now in surplus, due to the huge
improvement in trade performance stemming mainly from foreign sector
activities.  As FDI is export-oriented trade flows have been large, with exports
representing 69.5% of GDP in 1995.  This has lifted merchandise trade well into
surplus, with the trade balance as a percentage of GDP in 1995 equaling
21.3%.  However, FDI has also led to a large factor income deficit.  The level of
EU transfers is also quite large, and their removal from the calculation of the
current account balance would result in a small current account deficit.
The fact that Ireland’s FDI has been concentrated in the tradeable sector
theoretically means that foreigners are the main beneficiaries of the product of
the investment.  And theoretically New Zealand’s FDI, concentrated mainly in
the non-tradeable sector, benefits New Zealanders.  But the positive by-
products of FDI have been important for Ireland ￿ reduced unemployment,
transfer of skills, knowledge and technology, and exposure to international
competitive practises and pressures.  These factors mean that Ireland has
benefited greatly from FDI.
Unemployment
Ireland experienced the fastest rate of expansion of employment in Europe
between 1985-95, but the unemployment rate is still high at around 10%.  The
problem is with long-term unemployment (60% of total unemployment in 1995),
which tends to be structural in nature.  Older, less educated workers are losing
their positions within the downsizing traditional sectors, and are unable to find
work in the rapidly growing modern sector.  Their lack of education means they
make up a large group of people that are difficult to employ.  Young uneducated
people also make up a distinct group in the long-term unemployment statistics.
It seems then that education is becoming increasingly important for job-seekers.
Also, the high population growth rates in Ireland have meant that there have
been large inflows into the ranks of job-seekers.
Education
Emphasis has been put on the education system in Ireland, in recognition of its
importance.  New Zealand still has a greater proportion of students attaining
higher levels of education, but there is a larger emphasis on technical and
scientific disciplines in Ireland.  There is also anecdotal evidence of a far higher
private contribution to education in Ireland in the form of private tutoring and so6
forth.  Education has traditionally been a passport to greater opportunities for
the Irish, and as such there is an entrenched attitude towards education that is
very positive.  This perhaps constitutes an important cultural difference between
Ireland and New Zealand.
Future Prospects
In the short-term Ireland is in danger of overheating.  The economy showing
signs of producing beyond sustainable capacity, and options for addressing the
problem are limited, given the constraints of the imminent currency union.
There will have to be moves by the Irish government to dampen down the
economy if they wish to avoid ‘bubbling over’.
Looking to the medium term, there are concerns about the marginalisation of
Ireland in EU policy once the currency union commences operation.  Peripheral
countries such as Ireland are worried that policy decisions will reflect the needs
of the core EU countries, and will not deal with shocks hitting other economies.
Another concern is that the labour market will be under more pressure as
shortages of labour, both skilled and unskilled, emerge.  This is due to the
slowing of labour force growth.  Finally, Ireland may have to undertake some
serious microeconomic reform in the future.  There is a need to enhance
flexibility within the economy in order to cope with asymmetric shocks, since the
currency union will restrict Ireland’s options.
Despite these concerns though, forecasts of growth are strong by New
Zealand’s standards.  Growth rates of over 4% are predicted until at least 2010
￿ a drop from current highs, but still very respectable.  This continued faith in
the growth performance of Ireland reflects the underlying strong fundamentals
of Ireland, such as its location and open stance.
Conclusions
Ireland’s growth is due to a number of factors.  First of all Ireland is an English
speaking nation on the edge of a large unified market, of which they are a
member.  They have actively encouraged foreign investment, which has been
directed into high-tech exporting sectors.  This created job opportunities for
skilled labour and increased productivity.  The macroeconomy was relatively
stable, with low inflation and a steady exchange rate.  Membership of the ERM
helped to achieve this.  In addition, fiscal moderation was followed with the aim
of meeting the fiscal terms of the Maastricht Treaty.
Ireland has had a favourable demographic structure, with a young population
supplemented by increased female participation and higher levels of
immigration.  Workers are well educated and skilled, and wage levels are
relatively low.  This has enabled the growth of high-tech sectors within the
economy.  Ireland was also fortunate to receive structural grants from the EU,7
which may have been useful in easing the transition from agriculture to
manufacturing.  It is unlikely that these grants had a large growth-enhancing
effect though.  It may be too that Ireland is just lucky!
There are issues that Ireland faces in the future, the nearest being the danger of
overheating.  Further down the track Ireland may have cause for concern over
the operation of the currency union, its competitiveness, and the process of
structural change.  Despite this though, growth forecasts are bright by New
Zealand standards, with growth predicted to be over 4% until at least 2010.
What can New Zealand take from Ireland’s growth experience?  Our location
and demographic structure are given, so perhaps New Zealand has to be twice
as smart as other countries to achieve the same gains.  We already have low
inflation, and have been through extensive reforms.  But while Ireland has not
undertaken microeconomic reform to the extent New Zealand has, our position
in the world may mean we have to address rigidities faster and more rigorously
to remain in the game.
Ireland’s stable macroeconomic environment may be something New Zealand
can learn from.  Are there different ways of running monetary policy that would
yield a more stable exchange rate, and would this be beneficial for growth?
Also, Ireland has attracted high quality investment, and has high quality
workers.  Is New Zealand’s FDI policy growth maximising?  Should we consider
the merits of a competitive tax regime?  What can we do to improve the quality
of our labourforce?
According to the OECD, New Zealand will fall further and further behind the
OECD average if our current performance is maintained.  If anything, this study
of Ireland has suggested that our potential may be much smaller given our
location.  Therefore New Zealand must put extra energy into improving the
environment for growth and getting our policies right.8
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1. MOTIVATION
Ireland is a relatively small island nation, situated on the western periphery of
the European Union.  It is divided politically into Northern Ireland and the
Republic of Ireland; however, our interest here lies solely with the Republic of
Ireland1.  Ireland became independent from Great Britain in 1921 after nearly
800 years of Anglo-Irish struggle, although in 1973 the country formalized fresh
economic linkages by joining the then European Economic Community.
Since the mid-1980’s and particularly in the 1990’s Ireland’s rate of economic
growth has been markedly above the European and OECD averages.  Yet in
the early to mid 1980’s the situation facing Ireland was serious;  the country was
experiencing poor growth, growing unemployment, escalating inflation,
mounting current account and fiscal deficits, and a huge debt to GDP ratio.  The
need for adjustment was apparent but the political gridlock of coalitions retarded
any initiatives.  Like New Zealand, it took a near crisis situation and a change of
government for reform to begin.
Ireland’s experience in the 1980’s, culminating in a period of economic reform,
was not unlike that of New Zealand.  Indeed, McNelis and Bollard (1991) note
the common economic experiences of Ireland and New Zealand, including:
• a history of primary production and exposure to volatile commodity markets;
• past isolation in trade/financial markets;
• sudden changes in financial policies/exchange controls to allow inflows of
foreign capital;
• heavy borrowing and subsequent build-up of a large external debt;
• changes in leadership initiating fiscal austerity in order to gain credibility in
overall macroeconomic policy; and
• adjustment and stabilisation coupled with high unemployment.
The table below sets out some of the main economic indicators for New
Zealand and Ireland over the pre and post-reform years.  It clearly
demonstrates the motivation behind the increasing interest in Ireland’s
economic performance.  Although both countries undertook reforms in response
to a potential meltdown, the results have been disparate.  With a GDP per
capita of around 65% of New Zealand’s in 1980, Ireland’s strong economic
growth enabled them to surpass New Zealand by 1995, even with relatively
lower participation rates and a relatively smaller working age population due to
the young population base.  This achievement has been accompanied by a
current account surplus, extremely high openness to trade, and a low inflation
rate.  Unemployment though is still rather high;  again, demographics play a role
here.
                                           
1  Hereafter referred to simply as Ireland.13
Table 1:  Comparative Overview of Ireland and New Zealand
GNP per Capita (US $, 1987 prices)
1980 1985 1990 1995
Ireland 7529 7577 9453 11706
New Zealand 10252 10859 10903 11958
Note:  Converted to US$ at 1987 exchange rate.  NZ real exchange rate in 1987 is 1.7% above
1980-95 average, while the comparable figure for Ireland is 2.1%.
Trade
Current Account Balance (% of GDP)
1980-85 1986-90 1990-95 1996 1997
Ireland -8.2 -1.1 2.3 2.1 1.8
New Zealand -6.2 -3.9 -2.5 -4.1 -7.0
Exports (% of GDP)
1980-85 1986-90 1991-95
Ireland 45.4 52.6 61.9
New Zealand 24.0 20.5 23.8
Imports (% of GDP)
1980-85 1986-90 1991-95
Ireland 51.7 45.3 48.0
New Zealand 24.9 20.0 22.5
Trade Balance (% of GDP)
1981-85 1986-90 1991-95
Ireland -5.2 6.6 13.8




Ireland 13.4 3.3 2.5
New Zealand 12.9 9.4 2.1
Household Savings Rate
1980-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996 1997
Ireland 19.1 14.1 11.9 9.4 8.2
New
Zealand
8.4 6.0 3.2 3.0 3.814
Investment - public and private (% of GDP)
1980-85 1986-90 1991-95
Ireland 27.1 20.7 17.6
New Zealand 23.3 24.1 19.1
Government
Government deficit/surplus (% of GDP)
1980 1990 1994 1995 1996
Ireland -6.3 -2.6 -2.0 -2.4 -1.1
New
Zealand
0.1* -4.6* 0.9 3.1 3.6
*  Note:  The Crown moved to an accrual accounting framework in 1991/92.
The closest proxy to the operating balance (shown for 1994-96) is the series
adjusted financial balance (shown for 1980 and 1990).  The two series are not
directly comparable.
Tax (% of GDP)
1980 1990 1994 1995 1996
Ireland 34.4 39.8 42.0 40.4 40.9
New
Zealand
30.6 36.9 34.0 35.5 35.8
Labour
Unemployment Rate
1980-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996 1997
Ireland 12.15 15.68 14.46 11.94 10.34
New
Zealand
3.79 5.71 8.91 6.12 6.65
Participation Rates
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Ireland 61.9 60.9 60.2 59.7 60.2 60.9 62.3
New
Zealand
63.8 63.8 63.4 63.3 64.6 65.3 65.5
Working Age Population (% of total population)
1980-85 1986-90 1991-94
Ireland 59.34 60.71 62.70
New Zealand 65.93 67.04 67.08
Employment Structures (% of total civilian employment)
Agriculture Industry Services15
Ireland 12 27.6 60.5
New Zealand 10.4 24.9 64.6
Given some of the similarities between the two economies, for example, their
peripheral nature, near-identical populations, similar employment structures and
open approaches to international trade; and combining this with their similar
encounter with, and disparate results of, economic reforms, it seems most
worthwhile to examine Ireland’s experience.  Of course, there are differences
between the two economies as well, the most prominent being location, as the
maps below show.16
The circles on the maps have a radius of around 2200 km.  It is obvious that
Ireland has much greater proximity to a collection of developed countries, while
New Zealand’s circle only just touches the Australian coast.
Nevertheless, if Ireland’s growth could be linked to various policy initiatives then
there may be lessons to be learnt for New Zealand.17
2. SITUATION LEADING TO REFORM IN IRELAND
The Early Days...
Having followed protectionist policies for a number of years, the Irish
government decided in 1958 to pursue an export-oriented trade policy with
foreign direct investment occupying the central role.  The aim was to establish
an extensive and sophisticated industrial base with a high export focus, by
using imported private capital and technology.  It was hoped this would cut
unemployment, enable more efficient resource use, and stimulate growth and
modernisation in the economy2.
Growth rates were reasonably varied in the period 1960-75, but predominantly
remained above 2% per year.  Real GDP growth even surpassed 8% briefly, in
1968.  In addition, growth looked to be on an upward trend from the mid-1960’s.
Unemployment over the period was stable, and hovered between 4-6% for all
but the last observation.  In general then, the Irish economy looked to be
growing over the period, with unemployment remaining at a relatively low level.
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2  O’Sullivan (1993)18
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Oil Shocks Hit...
However, around the time that Ireland joined the EEC, the first oil shock hit the
world, and the price of oil rose sharply in response.  A worldwide recession
followed, and the response of the Irish government was to strongly boost
government spending.  This Keynesian-type approach aimed to offset the
decline in aggregate demand resulting from higher import prices, and was
financed by foreign borrowing.  The large inflow of capital was followed by an
appreciation of the Irish currency, and a rise in interest rates.  Another
consequence of increased government current spending was a skyrocketing
current budget deficit3, which rose from 0.4% of GDP in 1973 to 6.8% by 19754.
However, GDP did continue to grow during the period 1973-77, by around 4%
per year, although the unemployment rate also grew, reaching 9% in 1977.
The budget deficit fell as the recession passed, although only to 3.6% of GDP,
not nearly as low as in 1973.  However, in 1978 the new government boosted
spending in a ‘think-big’ style as an attempt to reduce unemployment.  This
                                           
3  The narrowest definition of the budget deficit in the Irish case is the current budget deficit,
which comprises the difference between government current spending and current receipts (tax
and non-tax).
4  Haughton (1995)19
spending was pro-cyclical, in contrast to the counter-cyclical spending carried
out between 1973-75.  It did have the appearance of success, with economic
growth continuing, and unemployment falling to around 7% in 1979.  However,
the effects of this spending are still being felt, as the large increases in the
public services have not yet been fully rationalised.
Ireland’s Luck Runs Out...
Unfortunately though, Ireland’s luck ran out after 1979.  As the government was
forced to borrow heavily to finance the increased current expenditure, the debt
to GDP ratio rose from 52% in 1973 to reach 129% in 1986.  The cost of
servicing this debt in 1986 came to 94% of all revenue from personal income
tax.  The solutions that successive governments tried to implement were based
on tax increases, but these increases failed to raise the tax take by a significant
amount.  Much of the spending had gone to finance imports, and the current
account deficit had widened accordingly.  Growth was just 1.5% per annum
between 1979-86, unemployment rose to reach 17% in 1986, and the Irish
pound was devalued several times within the EMS structure in the early 1980’s.
The Turning Point...
The turning point came with the election of the Fianna Fail party once again in
1987.  This government set out immediately to cut the fiscal deficit, even though
they had campaigned on continued fiscal generosity.  The main measures
employed were eliminating or reducing social initiatives, cutting public sector
employment and controlling wage settlements with state employees, and
reducing public capital expenditure5.  The fiscal deficit fell, and confidence in
the economy began to grow.  However, while this fiscal reform was vital, it did
not address the underpinning economic structures ￿ a big difference between
the New Zealand’s and Ireland’s reforms.
Reducing interest rates was also a priority.  The Irish government assisted by
convincing the markets of their intention to stick to the reform program and to
the maintenance of the exchange rate within the EMS.  Credibility was
enhanced through such initiatives as ECU-denominated bond issues, using
market rates instead of the higher Irish rates (so taking on the exchange rate
risk)6.  Ireland may also have borrowed some credibility from the EMS, since
the credibility of the system itself was enhanced by the converging economic
performances and exchange rate stability of the member states.  Participation in
the EMS allowed a convergence of interest rates and inflation towards German
levels, and as such Irish rates, both real and nominal, fell from 1987.
                                           
5  Mawdsley (1995)
6  Massey (1989)20
Regarding other policy initiatives, the Irish government continued to provide
support and incentives to foreign investors, as they had done since the 1950’s.
Other policies included the setting up of a special agency to help address the
problem of unemployment,  a selection of tax reforms,  and a national wage-
setting agreement.
The table below details a few key indicators over the period 1960-96, broken
down into rough periods of economic history that parallel those discussed.
Table 2:  Key Indicators 1960-96 (%)
1960-75 1976-86 1987-93 1994-96
GDP Growth 4.5 3.2 5.0 9.2
Exports/GDP 3.8 27.1 55.1 71.7
Agricultural
exports/GDP
43.3* 32.2 23.7 19.8**
Unemployment
(%)
5.1 11.1 15.2 12.9
Government
Deficit/GDP
-1.5* -7.0 -3.1 -1.8
*    data from 1970-75 only
**  1994-95 data only
Source:  OECD Database, PCInfos, Department of Agriculture and Food.
It can be noted that Ireland started on the ‘reform’ track earlier than New
Zealand.  The joining of the then EEC in 1973, and the EMS in 1979, were
effectively large reforms to the trading sector and monetary policy.  However,
fiscal reform started at around the same time as in New Zealand.  It is likely that
there are lags in the gains from reform, particularly from the opening up of the
economy.  But, if anything, this highlights the need for more understanding of
adjustment paths.
The remainder of this paper explores in more detail the growth experience of
Ireland, and outlines the main policy areas of interest, with special emphasis on
the role of foreign direct investment.21
3. IRELAND’S GROWTH PERFORMANCE
Economic Growth
The growth experience of Ireland post-reforms has been impressive, both in
terms of GDP and GNP.  Generally growth has exceeded 2% since the late
1980’s, and has reached peaks of over 8%, as can be seen from the graph
below.  However, the spike in growth in the early 1990’s was referred to as a
period of jobless growth.  While recorded growth was impressive, anecdotal
evidence suggests the economy did not feel as if it were growing ￿ indeed
there was large-scale migration at this time.































































Source:  World Bank database, PCInfos
An interesting view of Irish economic performance pre- and post-1987 reforms
can be provided by breaking down the growth data into smaller time periods.
Growth certainly seems to have moved to a higher level since 1987.
Table 3:  Economic Growth (average annual %)
Time Period GNP Growth GDP Growth
1980-86 1.1 2.2
1987-96 5.3 5.422
One other feature to note is the divergence between GDP and GNP per capita
in absolute terms.  This is due to the large amount of foreign owned activity in
the economy, with outward factor income flows increasing in magnitude over
recent years.





































































Source:  Calculated from OECD database, PCInfos
Growth Accounting
Growth accounting is a useful tool for attributing Ireland’s growth to changes in
labour and capital inputs.  This method takes the growth rate of output, and
breaks it down into contributions by labour, capital, and total factor productivity
(TFP).  Total factor productivity is the output growth which cannot be accounted
for by growth in inputs, so it captures such elements as productivity gains or
technological advance.  Growth accounting calculates TFP as the rate of growth
in output less the weighted growth rates of labour and capital inputs.
Results for Ireland...
A recent piece of work by Kenny (1996) dealt with accounting for Irish growth
for the period 1970-1996.  Kenny uses both GDP and GNP growth rates to
signify output growth, and finds that the results are fairly similar.  The
contribution of TFP when using GDP growth as the focus is approximately 59%,23
compared to a contribution of approximately 50% when using GNP.  Kenny
notes that studies of other countries have generally yielded a TFP contribution
of between 30-50%, therefore Ireland’s TFP growth appears to be above
average, particularly when using GDP as the measure of output.  He does make
the caveat though that the data on labour is not adjusted for quality of the
workers.
Irish GDP growth has been varied over the period, with cyclical peaks and
troughs.  Cyclical low points in 1976, 1983 and 1986 saw growth below 1%, but
growth reached 8% in 1978, 1990, and 1995.  This yields an average growth
rate over the sample period of 4.11% per annum.  Kenny finds TFP growth has
also been volatile over the period, but that it tended to follow cyclical trends.  In
general it has been positive, so the interpretation could be that overall efficiency
in production has been improving steadily over time.
To abstract from the cyclical variations,  Kenny looks at the average
contributions of capital, labour and TFP to Irish growth over the sample period
1970-1996.  The average GDP growth rate of 4.11% is accounted for by:
• average annual growth in TFP of 2.4%;
• a labour contribution of 0.55%;
• a capital contribution of 1.16%7.
These numbers suggest that TFP accounts for 59% of growth, while 28% is
attributable to capital growth, and the remaining 13% to labour.  The low
contribution of labour may reflect weak employment growth relative to output
growth.  This could raise questions about how well the labour market operates,
and this is discussed later under ‘Wage Setting”.  Strong TFP growth could well
be due to the concentration of FDI in high-tech, high productivity sectors of
industry.  This would have had the effect of shifting resources from low value-
added sectors to high value-added ones, and extracting greater outputs from
resources.
Results for New Zealand...
The Irish growth accounting literature can be compared to that for New Zealand.
Data from Janssen (1996) reveals that for the period 1970-96, New Zealand’s
average growth rate of 2.28% was accounted for by:
• annual average TFP growth of 0.83%
• average labour productivity growth of 1.23%
• average capital productivity growth of 0.22%.
These numbers imply that TFP accounted for 36% of growth, with 54%
attributable to labour and the remaining 10% to capital.  These numbers are a
                                           
7  To make these calculations the average shares over the period, 0.68 and 0.32 for labour
and capital respectively, are used to weight an average growth of labour of 0.81% and capital
stock growth of 3.64%.24
distinct contrast to those for Ireland, particularly, the greater role of labour and
distinctly lesser role of capital and total factor productivity.
Another study which highlights the differences between Ireland and New
Zealand is a paper by Bosworth, Collins and Chen (1995).  Their paper applies
a growth accounting approach to a variety of countries and regions.  From the
study it can be calculated that Irish TFP growth has far exceeded that in New
Zealand since the 1960’s, as shown below.  Perhaps the difference in recent
years can be explained by the relative levels of development in each country ￿
Ireland is moving resources to the manufacturing sector, while New Zealand is
shifting more into services, where productivity gains may be less.  It may also
be that productivity is more difficult to measure in the service sector, in which
case New Zealand’s productivity growth may be understated.






Source:  Calculated from Bosworth, Collins and Chen (1995)
A Convergence Story?
Putting Ireland’s growth experience into the context of growth theory, many
authors have commented on the consistency of Ireland’s performance with the
convergence hypothesis.  The hypothesis generally refers to a situation where
lower income countries, which have a lower level of capital stock, will ‘catch up’
to the more developed countries.  Kenny’s paper notes that Irish growth is
outstripping the EU and USA, which is consistent with this convergence
hypothesis, ie catching up to the group entails a higher level of growth.  The
1990-96 period is most notable with Irish growth 3 times that of the EU.  The
1970-96 period that Kenny focuses on yields an average growth rate of 4.11%
per annum, compared with 2.25% and 2.75% for the EU and US respectively
over the same period.  The results for Irish TFP shares were also consistent
with convergence, as ‘catch-up’ countries generally exhibit a higher TFP growth.
O’Grada and O’Rourke (1996) focus on Irish economic growth between 1945-
88, using both the Heston-Summers and the Maddison/OECD data sets.  They
note that while the OECD countries have shown a clear convergence pattern,
with growth rates being highest for countries with low GDP/capitas, Ireland was
a clear outlier with relatively low growth for its initial income level.  This
performance is even more pronounced when GNP is used.  The result seems to
suggest that while Ireland was converging to OECD levels between 1945-88, it
was doing so at a slower than expected rate.25
O’Grada and O’Rourke’s comments as to why Ireland’s performance was
relatively poor included such factors as the small size of the economy, the
importance of agriculture, low-quality investment decisions (particularly by the
public sector), and rent seeking in industrial relations.  They also cite proximity
to the slowly growing UK ￿ Ireland could be considered a region of the UK, and
certainly they effectively have a common labour market.
O’Grada and O’Rourke do conclude that the Irish economy had been one of the
fastest growing in Europe since 1988 (the end-date of their comparative
analysis), and that a continuation of that growth would modify or even reverse
their gloomy appraisal of the post-1973 period in Ireland.  As Ireland has indeed
maintained its strong growth performance, it could be suggested that the
convergence story may be more applicable now.  Perhaps convergence is
conditional on the policy environment that the economy is operating within, and
convergence for Ireland has sped up with the ‘coming together’ of growth
conducive policies.  It may also have been accelerated with the use of
previously unemployed or underemployed resources, for instance, young
people moving off the farm into the manufacturing sector.  The convergence
story does serve to highlight a question for New Zealand ￿ which
country/countries are we converging to?  Australia?  The OECD?
Sectoral Breakdown of Growth
Agriculture’s Decline...
The ‘modern’ sector has been growing in size and importance in Ireland,
particularly under the influence of substantial foreign direct investment.
Meanwhile the agricultural sector has been in decline, freeing up resources for
deployment in other more productive parts of the economy.  Gross agricultural
product (GAP) as a percentage of GDP (in terms of factor costs) has fallen
steadily, to reach just 7.7% in 1995.  The Irish Department of Agriculture and
Food take GAP to be the most widely accepted measure of the contribution of
agriculture to the economy.26

































































Source:  Irish Department of Agriculture and Food, NZ data from PCInfos.
Agriculture has also declined in importance in Ireland’s export bundle.  As a
percentage of total Irish exports agriculture now comprises just 10.5%.
Agricultural exports are defined as including animal and vegetable products of
an indigenous nature8.  A broader definition is provided by the Department’s
measurement of Food, live animals and drink, which includes many of the items
excluded from agricultural exports but which depend very heavily on the
agricultural sector for raw materials.  New Zealand’s agricultural exports are
notably more prominent in the total export bundle, possibly due to higher
productivity in agriculture in New Zealand as compared to Ireland.  The figure is
declining however.
                                           
8  It excludes bread, pastry and sugar confectionery, casein and other food and animal
products of a highly processed nature  such as infant food for retail sale, cola concentrates etc.,
and leather and spun wool.27














































































Food, live animals and drink - Ireland 
Agriculture - Ireland
Agriculture - NZ
Source:  Irish Department of Agriculture and Food.  New Zealand figures from
PCInfos.
Most of Ireland’s exports of agricultural goods go to other EU member
countries, with just under 25% of these exports going to the United States and
other non-EU countries in 1995.  Great Britain (including Northern Ireland) is a
large buyer of Irish agricultural goods, taking 34.3% in 1995, although their
importance has diminished noticeably since Ireland joined the EU.
Employment in the agriculture sector has fallen by around 100,000 people since
1975, while employment in the food/drink sector has fallen by approximately
14,000.  These two sectors accounted for 14.8% of total employment in 1995,
with agricultural workers making up 11.3% of total workers and food/drink
workers accounting for the other 3.5%.  Employment within the agricultural
sector has changed also, with landholders and labourers increasing as a
percentage of total agricultural workers (to 78% and 16% respectively), while
the percentage of assisting relatives has fallen.  In New Zealand, workers in the
sector of agriculture, forestry, and fishing, have remained relatively steady at
around 10% of total employment since 1985.  These figures may not be directly
comparable but do give some idea of the level of employment in the general
area of agriculture.28




























































































































Source:  Irish Department of Agriculture and Food, NZ data from PCInfos.
It is important to note that the Irish agricultural sector receives a large amount of
funding from the EU under the umbrella of structural funds, in particular from the
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF).  The
Guarantee part of this fund is designed to meet the objectives of the EU’s
Common Agricultural Policy, while the Guidance part helps to co-finance
programmes concerned with the reorganisation of the sector and the
development of the ‘social fabric of rural areas’.  Over the period 1973-95, the
agricultural sector received Ir£16,969.5 million from the EU under the EAGGF.
This agricultural support makes up the bulk of all support received from the EU.
The table below sets out this information for a recent period, but it is important
to note that the pattern presented has dominated consistently since 1973.29
Table 5:  EU Support for Irish Agriculture, 1992-95
                Ir£mln ($NZ mln)

























75.3 75.5 99.5 76.3
Source:  Data from the Irish Department of Agriculture and Food, and the CSO.
New Zealand $ equivalents calculated using contemporary exchange rates.
Industry’s Rise...
One corollary of a decline in the importance of agriculture in Irish output,
exports and employment is the rise of industry.  From 1978 to 1995 there was
real growth of 155% in the industrial sector9.  Later statistics break this category
down to show the contribution of several sub-sectors;  for instance, between
1990-95 the Chemical sub-sector experienced real growth of 92%, with
Computers and Instrument Engineering growing by 60%, and Electrical
Engineering growing by 91%, over the same period.  The industrial sector
accounted for 38% of GDP in 1995, or approximately Ir£13 billion10.
Industrial products are also accounting for a much larger proportion of exports.
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals made up 22% of Ireland’s export bundle in
1996, with Data Processing, Machinery and Equipment, and Other
Manufactures contributing 21%, 17% and 14% respectively11.  The activities of
foreign firms have had a great deal to do with the growing importance of
industry in Ireland, and this influence will be discussed in greater depth in the
next section.
The change in the structure of the Irish economy does mirror that of other
developing countries, in that agriculture lessens in importance while industry
and, later, services become prominent.
                                           
9  Based on CSO estimates of GDP at constant 1990 factor cost by sector of origin.
10  Dept of Enterprise, Trade and Employment 1998
11  Dept of Enterprise, Trade and Employment 199830
4. MONETARY POLICY
Monetary Policy and the EU
Monetary policy in Ireland has been somewhat constrained since 1979 by their
membership in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European
Monetary System (EMS).  Prior to 1979 Ireland had a fixed one-to-one
exchange link with the UK.  Ireland saw EMS membership as allowing it to link
its monetary policy to a lower inflation country, namely Germany.  It was a good
time to break the tie with the sterling, as continued maintenance of the tie would
have entailed a large overvaluation of the Irish pound.  Ireland has drawn great
benefits from the ERM, in the form of low inflation and a relatively stable real
exchange rate.
Ireland seems to have a number of goals as far as monetary policy is
concerned.  One is the maintenance of low and stable inflation, which has
certainly been achieved since the mid-1980’s.  However, the Irish authorities
also seem to strive for a stable exchange rate, and competitiveness against the
United Kingdom.  This trio of goals can be hard to achieve simultaneously in a
fixed exchange rate environment, and will be harder still once Ireland moves to
join the European Monetary Union (EMU).
The implications of the imminent EMU for Ireland are far-reaching, as they are
for every potential player in this arrangement.  The Governor of the Central
Bank of Ireland expressed concerns in 1991 that the monetary policy prevailing
will be that which suits the central members, not peripheral economies such as
Ireland12.  These views are no longer voiced, publicly at any rate.  However, if
these concerns were realised, then given that the exchange rate is no longer
available as a tool, inflationary pressures in Ireland would not be met by rising
interest rates throughout the EMU area.  Rather, the resulting fall in
competitiveness would have to be met by other adjustment procedures such as
greater unemployment, migration of capital or labour, countervailing policies
from the centre, or a combination of these things.  These are changes which
may be hard to implement, or may be relatively more painful than a simple
exchange rate adjustment.
Certainly the final completion of the single market is likely to lead to more
intense competition in the EU, which may lead to clusters of production near the
core rather than the periphery.  This would increase the risk of sustained
divergence between the periphery and the EU core.  There is also a danger that
Ireland is overly vulnerable to a global slowdown in high-tech sectors, and that
such an asymmetric shock will not be able to be addressed through the
exchange rate.  Again, internal adjustment would bear the brunt.
                                           
12  Doyle (1991)31
Inflation
The battle with inflation had historically been an ongoing one for Ireland.  Even
after joining the EMS inflation was still a problem, due to concerns over
Ireland’s policy credibility.  Specifically, until the early 1980’s the Exchequer’s
borrowing requirements stemming from sizeable fiscal deficits were met by
large scale monetary financing.  The resulting imbalances were reflected in high
inflation, a weakening exchange rate and a substantial current account deficit.
The weakening exchange rate was propped up somewhat by the large-scale
use of foreign exchange intervention - however the foreign currency used for
this was also acquired through extensive and ultimately unsustainable foreign
borrowing.  This behaviour undermined Ireland’s credibility in maintaining it’s
exchange rate within the ERM.
Since the mid-1980’s inflation has been steady and low, ranging between 2-4%
per year.  This reflects the direction of the Central Bank of Ireland, whose main
objective is “to safeguard the integrity of the currency”, which in practice is
taken to mean the maintenance of low and stable inflation in Ireland13.  The
initial fall in inflation in the early 1980’s was aided by fiscal consolidation and a
subsequent fall in borrowing.  It should be noted though that inflationary
pressures are currently building in Ireland, with the strong growth performance
heating up the economy.

















































































Source:  OECD database, PCInfos.
                                           
13  Kenny & McGettigan (1996)32
Interest Rate Policy
In terms of interest rate policy, the Irish Central Bank seeks to smooth
temporary and predictable fluctuations in domestic interest rates, since with a
fixed exchange rate the bank cannot actually control interest rates14.  The
motivation behind this policy was to reduce the harmful effects of volatile
interest rates on investment decisions.






































































































Source:  OECD, PCInfos
Note:  Short term interest rates are taken as follows
• Germany - 3 month FIBOR
• Ireland - 3 month interbank rate
• New Zealand - 90 day bank bills
The ERM currency crisis in 1992/3 saw Irish short term interest rates skyrocket
to around 40% (point not shown on graph), as the Central Bank sought to
defend the currency from expectations of devaluation.  Devaluation became
unavoidable however, and short term interest rates fell to a fairly stable level of
                                           
14  Leddin & O’Leary (1995)33
just over 5%15.  Short term rates have certainly moved nearer to the level
exhibited by Germany, although the gap has widened since the 1995 currency
crisis, sparked by instability in Mexico, as the Irish pound depreciated against
the German mark.  New Zealand short term interest rates have been both more
volatile and at a higher level than these European countries.










































































































Source:  OECD, PCInfos.
Note:  Long term interest rates as follows
• Germany - 7-15 year public sector bonds
• Ireland - 15 year government bonds
• New Zealand - 10 year government bonds
Long term interest rates in Ireland have been steadily converging to German
rates and are now practically identical.  Ireland is therefore benefiting from the
links with Germany as they are now able to access lower interest rates.  Once
again New Zealand exhibits higher rates than both these countries, although the
rate has shown convergence towards German levels.  It may be that the
openness of international capital markets in developed countries is reflected in
the convergence of interest rates.
                                           
15  It did not help that the centralised wage agreements in place prevented nominal wages
from falling.  Theoretically, when the Irish pound became overvalued the domestic price level
should have fallen to compensate, with a corresponding fall in nominal wages to hold the real
wage constant.  The wage agreements inhibited wages from falling and so devaluation did
prove to be inevitable.34
It is worth noting that, although not shown on the graphs, the Irish interest rates
follow United Kingdom rates very closely indeed, no doubt reflecting ongoing
linkages to the UK economy.
Exchange Rate Policy
Upon joining the EMS it was expected that in the initial period the Irish pound
would be overvalued.  Indeed, the failure of the real exchange rate to return
quickly to its 1979 level indicates the adjustment process was prolonged, which
further suggests adjustment costs were high.  Leddin and O’Leary (1995)
comment that the overvaluation was an important determinant of the rise in Irish
unemployment, although they acknowledge the impact of factors such as the
downturn in the world economy, tax increases, and rising oil prices.
One notable feature of Ireland’s real exchange rate as compared to New
Zealand’s is its stability.  Since 1984 Ireland’s real exchange rate has moved
within a band of around 16 points, while New Zealand’s more volatile exchange
rate has fluctuated within a band of around 36 points.  This is most likely a
byproduct of Ireland’s membership of the ERM, but is worth noting nonetheless.
Higher volatility of exchange rates may have a negative impact on productivity
and investment, as the heightening of uncertainty may discourage new firms
entering.  Stable exchange rates probably served to increase Ireland’s
desirability as an investment destination.



































































































Source:  OECD, PCInfos35
The real exchange rate has still not yet fallen back to the level exhibited pre-
1982, although it has moved to a lower level since the devaluation of 1993.
This went against the views of many Irish economists who believed that the
competitive gain resulting from a devaluation was short-lived.  It seems that the
movement in the nominal exchange rate has given Ireland a competitive gain,
and it has apparently highlighted the need to “find a realistic and workable
exchange rate policy”16.
The kind of statement made above serves to highlight the lack of clear targets
for monetary policy.  The literature and empirical evidence suggests that
inflation has been a primary target, yet a stable exchange rate, and
competitiveness against the United Kingdom, also feature strongly.  Certainly
the goal of competitiveness against the United Kingdom leads to a difficult
balancing act if the sterling/Dmark exchange rate changes;  should the sterling
parity be maintained so as not to affect competitiveness against the UK?  Or
should the link with the German currency be maintained so as to ensure that
inflation remains stable and that Ireland remains in contention for EMU?
Perhaps Ireland has simply been fortunate in recent years that all factors have
remained relatively stable.  In any case, Ireland has committed to locking itself
into the EMU, so future monetary policy decisions will be effectively out of their
hands.
                                           
16  Leddin & O’Leary (1995)36
5. FISCAL POLICY
The Main Objective
Since 1987 the overriding objective of Irish fiscal policy has been to reduce the
ratio of government debt to GNP.  As noted earlier, the Irish budget deficit first
emerged as a problem when the government began offsetting the
contractionary effects of higher oil prices.  Unfortunately the lack of a coherent
or consistent fiscal policy from 1973 through to 1986 meant that the budget
deficit did not disappear once the original purpose became redundant.  Instead
the increase in borrowing that appeared was fuelled by conscious policy
changes.  Tax increases in the early 1980’s were not useful in stemming the
deficit.  Growth of government debt also resulted from Exchequer borrowing for
capital purposes, and by the end of the 1980’s the level of debt had reached a
highly concerning level.


























































Source:  Leddin and O’Leary (1995), PCInfos.
Note:  Figure refers to Gross Government debt.
While debt as a percentage of GNP has fallen, it is important to note that
economic growth has had a large hand in this.  Reforms have not been as
comprehensive as those carried out in New Zealand, and there have not been
intense efforts to reduce expenditure.  Indeed the current continued growth of
expenditure in the order of 6% pa has resulted in warnings from the EU and EU37
Central Banks that government spending must be reined in to dampen down
inflationary pressure.
Fiscal Balance
The chart below illustrates Ireland’s fiscal balance.  The chart uses several
definitions of the government’s balance, which require explanation.  The
narrowest definition of the budget balance is the current balance, which is the
difference between government current spending and current receipts.  A wider
measure is the Exchequer Borrowing Requirement (EBR) which also includes
the balance between the capital receipts and capital spending of the exchequer.
The primary balance is defined as the EBR exclusive of interest payments.  A
measure which has increased in usage since the signing of the Maastricht
Treaty is the General Government balance, which goes one step further than
the EBR and includes the balances of local authorities and the non-commercial
semi-state bodies.
Figure 13:  Irish Fiscal Balance
Source:  IMF Staff Report for the 1996 Article IV Consultation - Ireland.38
The current budget balance has improved sharply since the mid-1980’s, with
reductions in expenditure being the main explanatory factor.  A widening of the
tax base and a decline in interest rates also assisted.  The fall in interest rates
was fueled partly by an increase in financial market confidence in Ireland as the
Irish government brought their finances under control.
The Irish government cites the Maastricht Treaty as the principal parameter
guiding their budget.  This is useful in terms of keeping finances under control,
but gives a focus to the balance between tax and spending, rather than the
actual levels of them.  Leddin and O’Leary (1995) call this a satisficing
approach, and note that since 1990 the primary budget surplus has actually
fallen, although it is still within the bounds of Maastricht.  They comment that the
Irish public finances may currently be benefiting from a sort of virtuous circle,
based on the combination of a primary budget surplus, low interest rates, and
robust economic growth, but the circle is not unbreakable.
Revenue and Expenditure
Method of Recording...
It is important to note the system of accounting that lies behind the Irish revenue
and expenditure figures.  The levels (in percent of GNP/GDP) do vary across
data sources, and this can cause confusion, as the differences are large.  The
reason is that the Irish Budget sets out spending into Gross Expenditure and
Net Expenditure, where Net Expenditure equals Gross Expenditure less Supply
Services Receipts.  These receipts are made up of employee and employer
social security levies.  The use of Net Expenditure tends to understate the
involvement of the government in the economy.  In addition the absence of
these receipts on the revenue side of the budget tends to understate the level of
taxation in the economy.  By adding the Supply Services Receipts to revenue,
instead of subtracting it from expenditure, a more accurate picture of Irish
revenue and expenditure levels can be gained.  This adjustment reconciles the
figures with those presented by the OECD and therefore this method is used in
this investigation.
However the figure below, taken from the IMF Staff Report for Ireland, does not
add Supply Services Receipts to the tax revenue figure.39
Figure 14:  Irish Revenue and Expenditure
Source:  IMF Staff Report for the 1996 Article IV Consultation - Ireland
Irish Government expenditure as a percentage of GNP has dropped from a high
of over 60% in the early 1980’s, to a more moderate level of around 43% from
1989 to 1996.  The corollary of this though is that while expenditure as a
percentage of GNP is stable, GNP is rising rapidly ￿ thus as noted earlier, Irish
expenditure is growing in absolute terms by quite a sizeable amount.  Revenue
comprised around 42% of GNP in 1996, down from levels of around 50% in the
early 1980’s.  Tax revenue has followed the trend and level of total revenue
fairly closely since the late 1980’s, with tax revenue being 40.9% of GNP in
1996.40
Components of Revenue and Expenditure...
The components of revenue and expenditure can be gleaned from Irish
government budget data.  The table below sets out some of the main
components from the 1998 Irish Budget.  GNP was projected to be Ir£41 640
million in 199817.
Table 6:  1998 Irish Budget - main components
Expenditure % of GNP* Revenue % of GNP*
Gross
Expenditure
42.0 Total Revenue 44.6
Service of public
debt
6.2 Tax Revenue 36.4
Interest 5.5 Customs 0.42
Economic
Services
3.2 Excise duties 6.4
Industry and
labour
1.5 Capital taxes 0.5
Agriculture 1.4 Stamp duties 1.1
Fisheries/forestry 0.1 Income tax 13.3
Tourism 0.1 Corporation tax 4.6
Infrastructure 0.2 VAT 9.6
Social Services 24.7 Agricultural levies 0.02
Health 7.1 Employment and
training levies
0.5
Education 5.6 Non-tax Revenue 8.2





Source:  Irish Department of Finance website
*    projected GNP
                                           
17  Estimated from Irish Budget 1998 Economic Background.41
These numbers can be compared to the New Zealand 1997/98 Budget, the
main components of which are presented below.  Projected GNP for this time
period was taken to be NZ$90 236 million18.
Table 7:  1997/98 New Zealand Budget
Expenditure % of GNP* Revenue % of GNP*
Total
Expenditure
38.4 Total Revenue 39.5
Finance costs 2.9 Tax Revenue 36.9
Economic and
industrial services
0.92 Source deductions 14.1
Primary services 0.35 Other persons 3.7
Heritage, culture
and recreation











Health 6.7 Foreign dividend
withholding tax
0.004
Education 6.3 GST 8.9
Core government
services
1.7 Excise tax 2.0
Law and order 1.4 Customs 1.1
Defence 1.2 Non-tax Revenue 2.7
Note:  Core government services is comprised mainly of departmental
expenses.
*  projected GNP
Source:  The Treasury
The most notable differences are New Zealand’s lower total expenditure and
revenue as a percentage of GNP.  Differences between actual components
include the much greater profile of debt financing costs for Ireland, New
Zealand’s higher social security and welfare spending, Ireland’s greater reliance
on excise taxes, and New Zealand’s greater tax take from personal income
(when including Other persons).  Ireland’s Supply Services Receipts (social
security levies) add a large chunk to revenue, which lifts Ireland’s total revenue
beyond the percentage shown in New Zealand.  Most of the other categories of
revenue and expenditure are fairly similar.  This in itself is interesting ￿
Ireland’s corporate tax receipts are marginally higher than New Zealand’s, yet
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New Zealand’s corporate tax rate is higher.  Perhaps this is because of higher
activity levels in Ireland?
It will be interesting to see the future path of expenditure in Ireland.  With strong
economic growth there may be increasing pressure on the Irish government to
improve the level and quality of public provision, perhaps to continental
European levels.  Such a move would be likely to increase inflationary
pressures in the economy and may serve to deteriorate the Balance of
Payments as domestic demand rose.  Ireland’s options are constrained though
by Maastricht, and the calls from EU institutions to rein in spending.
Another interesting area to note is asset sales.  Irish sales of state-owned firms
between 1988-92 represented 0.3% of their GDP, while over the same period
New Zealand’s sales averaged 3.6% of GDP.  State enterprises in Ireland have
a large presence in the energy, steel, transport and communications sectors,
with some holdings in banking and insurance companies, and other commercial
endeavours such as hotels.  Postal services, telecommunications services,
water, electricity and gas distribution, and railways are public monopolies.  The
current government is committed to a ‘viable and profitable state commercial
sector’ with changes in ownership taking place only if it is in the public interest
and in the best interests of the firm and its employees.  There must also be
consultations with the social partners.  Privatisation is moving slowly in Ireland,
but international competition may force changes.  Telecom Ireland is to be
floated next year ￿ perhaps more may follow?
Tax Policy
Ireland’s tax policy is characterised by a system of tax allowances and selective
taxation.  Each individual has a range of income (a set of tax allowances) on
which no tax is imposed.  The standard tax rate is then applied to income within
a certain range, beyond which a higher rate of tax applies.  This tends to narrow
the tax base and thus requires higher rates of tax, and therefore higher marginal
tax rates.
This is exacerbated by the fact that the Irish equivalent of GST is not applied to
all consumption goods, property taxes have a high tax-free threshold, and the
inheritance tax system differs depending on the relationship between the
parties.  This narrowing of the tax base tends to increase the distortionary
effects of the taxation system.
The tax system has also created significant distortions in resource allocation,
particularly in the property market.  Tax incentives from the 1980’s to boost the
building industry have had a large part in creating a speculative property bubble
in Dublin.43
Income Tax...
With respect to income tax, there are four different schedules, which in order of
importance are:
• Schedule E:  income from an office, employment or pension (PAYE system),
• Schedule D:  profits of trades, professions, rental income, interest income
and income from abroad,
• Schedule C:  interest income on certain government and other securities, and
• Schedule F:  income from distributions received from a resident company.
The present system in Ireland has two tax rates;  a standard rate of 24% and a
higher rate of 46%.  The standard rate applies as soon as the tax-free
allowances are used up;  the automatic allowances being £2500 for individuals
and £5000 for a married couple, single parent, or widow/er with children;  and
special allowances taking account of the social conditions of individuals, for
example, caring for incapacitated children, old age etc.  The Irish system is
neutral between marriage and non-marriage when both individuals are
participating in the labour market, but marriage is favoured when one individual
is not working in the formal labour force.  There are also allowances for people
on the PAYE system, and the self-employed are able to get allowances for
items such as petrol.  Discretionary allowances also apply, with allowances
given for contributions to superannuation funds, mortgage interest, health
insurance, business expansion schemes, and long term savings accounts.
Social Security...
The system for pay-related social insurance and levies is very complex, but
generally there is a class for employed persons and a class for self-employed
persons, with a variety of rates and conditions applying to different categories of
individuals within these broad classes.  Employer contributions also follow a
complex structure, with different rates applying to different bands of income.
The table below sets out the rates paid by employers and employees into the
Pay Related Social Insurance (PRSI) scheme.  Overall, employers contributed
70% of the scheme revenues in 1996.
Table 8:  Social Insurance Contribution (% weekly earnings - 1997)
Pay Related Social Insurance
Employers Employees
Below Ir£30 0.5 0
Ir£30 to Ir£80 8.5 0
Ir£80 to Ir£197 8.5 5.5
Ir£197 to Ir£260 8.5 5.5
Over Ir£260 12.0 5.5
Source:  OECD (1997)44
Other Taxes...
Capital gains tax is applied to assets on disposal, with the rate of inflation
subtracted from the nominal rate of capital gain so that only real gains are
taxed.  The standard rate was lowered in the 1998 Budget from 40% to 20%,
although land with development potential will still have gains taxed at 40%.  The
tax is applied to gains above an annual exemption of £1000 for an individual
and £2000 for a married couple.  There are special areas of concession, the
most significant being property, where the sale of a private individual’s primary
residence is exempt, unless its value has been inflated by redevelopment
potential.
The corporate tax system is characterised by its dual rates.  There is a standard
rate of 32%, and a lower rate of 25% for the first £50,000 of taxable profits.
There is also a preferential rate on profits in manufacturing and certain
internationally traded services of 10% (as discussed earlier).  There are
allowances available for capital expenditure, which can reduce the tax liability of
a firm.
Value-added tax is applied at rates of 0%, 2.5%, 12.5%, and 21%.  Food,
children’s clothing and footwear, passenger transport, and admission to cultural
and sporting events are exempt from VAT, and goods produced by labour-
intensive sectors tend to be put into the lower VAT classes.  It is only recently
that adult clothing/footwear, legal services, and electricity have been introduced
into the VAT system.  Hydrocarbon oils, alcohol, tobacco products and motor
vehicles are all subject to excise tax, with the justification that these products
impose externalities on others.
Average and Marginal Tax Rates...
Marginal tax rates, which affect people’s incentives to work, have been high in
Ireland, as have average tax rates.  However, when all allowances are taken
into account, the average rate does decrease.  This does reduce the
progressivity of the system though, leading to controversy over the share of the
tax burden.  The OECD 1997 study of Ireland outlined the rates of tax faced in
Ireland by individuals, as follows:45
Table 9:  Income Tax and Social Levies (% of average gross earnings of a single
person).
Tax Rates Proportion taxed at
Average Marginal Zero/Low Standard Higher
1985 35.0 56.5 31.2 50.3 18.5
1986 34.2 55.5 31.1 48.9 20.0
1987 35.5 55.8 29.6 46.6 23.9
1988 34.5 55.8 29.7 53.9 16.4
1989 33.2 55.8 28.5 55.5 16.0
1990 32.3 55.8 27.5 56.9 15.7
1991 32.3 55.8 26.7 56.2 17.1
1992 30.8 55.8 25.7 60.3 14.1
1993 32.4 55.8 24.9 58.7 16.4
1994 30.7 55.8 25.5 61.0 13.5
1995 29.1 55.8 25.0 64.7 10.3
1995 NZ 20.39 33.0 38.21 40.11 21.68
1996 28.6 55.8
1996 NZ 19.14 33.0 36.94 43.27 19.79
Source:  OECD (1997)
Note:  Ireland:  Tax rates include social security taxation and temporary income
tax levies.  The proportions taxed at the different levels take account of income
tax only.
New Zealand:  No zero tax rate applies.  See Appendix for data sources and tax
rates.
An international comparison of the total tax wedge shows that taxes in Ireland
are slightly below the OECD average.  However, the above table shows the
very high marginal tax rate faced by Irish workers, and the OECD study notes
that in 1996 a single person would have entered the top tax bracket at an
annual income that was almost 10% below the level of average earnings19.
The lowest possible marginal tax rate for a person to encounter is 34.8%.  New
Zealand certainly has much lower average and marginal tax rates.
Reform of the tax system?
Reform of the tax system has been under discussion for some time in Ireland.
From 1980-85 a Commission on Taxation published reports dealing with
recommendations on tax policy, for instance, taxing an individuals
comprehensive income independent of its source and at a single rate, with all
tax reliefs to be eliminated, with a single flat-rate social security tax.  For
corporate taxes they recommended taxing at the standard rate of income tax
with full imputation allowed.  Tax reliefs which were designed to attract foreign
investment were encouraged to be replaced with direct aid.  With respect to
consumption taxes, the Commission recommended a single rate of VAT on all
final purchases at a rate of 15%.  Other recommendations dealt with property
tax and tax administration.  These recommendations are being dealt with very
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slowly, and the complexities and distortions of the present system remain.
However, increasing pressure from outside Ireland, in the form of EU
requirements, will eventually institute change.  The 1998 Budget certainly
introduced several changes in the rates of tax, with downward movements
ranging between 2% and 20%.
Wage Setting
Since 1987 the control of inflation has been assisted by a system of wage
moderation, brought about by national pay agreements between unions,
employers and the government.  This type of wage bargaining is referred to as
corporatism.
There were several agreements in the 1970’s but the period between 1981-87
saw none, although moderation in wages was achieved during this time simply
because of rising unemployment.  A series of agreements were then negotiated
later in the 1980’s to consolidate that moderation ￿ Programme for National
Recovery (1988-90), Programme for Economic and Social Progress (1991-93),
Programme for Competitiveness and Work (1994-96) and Programme 2000:
Employment, Competitiveness and Inclusion (1997-2000).  Leddin and Walsh
(1997) note that a feature of the agreements has been that in return for low
nominal wage demands the government has held out the prospect of a
reduction in income taxation, improvements in social benefits, and a wide
variety of other measures.
Programme 2000...
To give a general flavour of these agreements, the Programme 2000 covers
pay policy, government spending, taxation, and social measures to reduce
poverty and exclusion20.   To increase the extent of social consensus generated
by the accord, a wide variety of groups were consulted, including associations
representing the Catholic and Protestant churches, the unemployed, women,
young people, and community groups.
With respect to pay, the new agreement allows for an annual increase of 2.9%
for each year in the agreement.   The 9.3% cumulative rise over the three year
period includes a centrally set increase of 7 ¼ % and a ‘local bargaining’ clause
which allows unions to negotiate additional increases up to a ceiling of 2% of
the pay bill.  Other initiatives encompass:
• a national anti-poverty strategy focusing on long-term unemployment,
educational disadvantage and low incomes;
• a new focus on gender equality and a government strategy for the
development and delivery of child care;
                                           
20  As discussed in OECD (1997) pg 43-45.47
• additional spending of £525 million to be spent on indexation to inflation and
other social inclusion initiatives over the three year period;
• income tax cuts of a cumulative £900 million between 1997-1999, and
business tax reductions of £100 million.
These initiatives must be addressed whilst keeping to pledges of the debt to
GDP ratio falling below 70%, general government deficit remaining below 1 ½%
of GDP, and growth of public spending staying below 2 percentage points in
excess of inflation.
There is pressure on this corporate wage negotiating model, particularly since
the agreements only seem to be followed in the public sector.  Much of the
private sector ignores the national wage agreement, as most of their workers
are non-unionised.  Rather they use short-term contracts.  This situation has led
to increased calls from the public sector for wage settlements to match those
seen in the private sector.  The expected acceleration of inflation leading up to
the next round of negotiations for a new programme are likely to increase these
tensions further.
Effects of Wage Control...
Leddin and Walsh (1997) comment that the centralised wage bargaining may
have contributed to relatively subdued domestic inflationary impulses in the
economy, but that persistent high unemployment is also very relevant in
subduing inflation.  They say that the test of Irish corporatism will be reconciling
falling unemployment with moderate wage inflation and/or dealing with a major
adverse shock, where the rigidity of the labour market due to this method of
wage setting could inhibit its ability to adapt.  While growth in wages may have
been controlled, labour inflexibility remains, and this could act as a constraint on
the economy.  However, it may be impossible in the future to maintain this type
of corporate model anyway, given that the majority of the private sector utilises
short-term contracts.
Keeping wages under control may have helped to attract FDI.  The IDA website
displays a graph of the cost of payroll, which shows hourly compensation
including additional costs, in $US for 1995, for a number of countries in Europe.
The data is sourced from the Swedish Employers Confederation, and clearly
shows Ireland’s level of wages to be quite low relative to most of the other
countries.48


































































Source:  IDA website
There is a lack of literature on the effects of these wage agreements.  What is
clear however, is that a dual labour market is operating, and it is beginning to
put strain on the bargaining model.49
6. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
The level and type of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been identified by
many commentators as being a crucial element in the success of the Irish
economy in recent years.  Ireland has had a history of free markets, and since
the late 1950’s Irish governments have actively encouraged foreign capital into
the country, predominantly through the use of grants and tax concessions.  In
this section the focus is first on the features of FDI inflows into Ireland, with the
role and structure of the incentive system following from this.
FDI Inflows
A 1994 OECD study of FDI in Ireland showed that foreign firms accounted for
half of Ireland’s industrial output and employment, and three-quarters of its
manufactured exports and imports21.  Indeed, the fastest growing sectors in the
Irish economy since the early 1980’s have been foreign owned.  Most foreign
investment has been concentrated in the ‘modern’ sector of computers,
semiconductors, office equipment, software, pharmaceuticals, electrical
engineering and soft drink concentrates22.  The financial services sector has
also been a recipient of large investment inflows, with the advent of the
International Financial Services Centre in Dublin.
The underlying conditions determining the incoming investment, as noted in the
1997 OECD Ireland country study, included the cumulative number of foreign
firms (perhaps reflecting an agglomeration effect), skilled labour availability, a
relatively high rate of return (likely partly due to the low tax environment), and
the fact that the education system is seen as being relevant to the needs of
business.  FDI into Ireland was also encouraged by Ireland’s entry into the then
EC in 1973.  Many US firms have opened subsidiaries in Ireland as a way of
accessing the European market and, overall, 70% of the manufacturing
companies operating in Ireland as at 1994 had set up since Ireland joined the
EC23.
There were no statistics in the Balance of Payments accounts on direct
investment flows at the time of the OECD FDI study, although a new system
was under construction which would include such statistics.  In the absence of
this kind of data, statistics were drawn from the Irish Industrial Development
Authority (IDA).  However, the IDA only records investment eligible for grant
assistance, which includes most investment in manufacturing and
                                           
21  Foreign firms operating in Ireland seem to import most of their raw materials and
componentry, thereby accounting for quite a large proportion of total Irish imports.
22  OECD (1997) pg. 13
23  OECD (1994) pg. 750
internationally-traded services but not all24.  The IDA comments that although
the data is incomplete it does account for a high (although decreasing)
proportion of total fixed asset investment by foreign-owned companies.
Surprisingly Small Inflows?
From 1974 to 1980 the amount of foreign fixed asset investment in Ireland was
relatively stable, averaging 3.15% of GDP per year25.  However, FDI inflows as
recorded by the OECD have been rather uneven since 1983, and are relatively
small with respect to the size of Irish GDP.  According to the OECD data, New
Zealand’s FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP have exceeded Ireland’s since
the mid-1980’s;  in the period 1981-91, the average percentage of FDI to GDP
in New Zealand was 1.4, while in Ireland it was 0.5.  In 1991-92 the difference
was particularly pronounced, with the average for New Zealand being 4%, while
Ireland achieved only 0.2%26.  This seems to present a puzzle, as FDI is
consistently advanced as one of the leading drivers of Ireland’s recent strong
economic growth.
However, using recent data from Ireland’s Central Statistics Office (CSO) yields
a different story.  Net inward FDI, including reinvested earnings, gives a figure
for FDI as a percentage of GDP that is much higher.  The chart below illustrates
the OECD and CSO data together.  Clearly the CSO data accords better with
the notion that FDI has been a major driver of growth in Ireland, and the figures
themselves are far more complete by virtue of including reinvested earnings.
                                           
24  The data does not include investment in fixed assets which are not grant aided;
investment in working capital; investment by foreign companies which are not IDA clients;  and
investments for mergers and acquisitions.
25  Bacon, Durkan & O’Leary (1982) pg 24
26  OECD (1994) pg51
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Source:  OECD (1994), CSO.
Green Fields and Exports...
The majority of the investment in Ireland has been in greenfield investment and
expansion with very little merger or acquisition activity;  again a different
experience to that of New Zealand.  The OECD study suggests the reason for
this is that Ireland’s relatively small initial industrial base, and hence potential for
growth, would present many more opportunities for new start ups than in a
larger more mature economy27.  However, it may also be due to the structure of
investment incentives, since the IDA offers special industrial sites and buildings
to potential investors.
Most of the foreign investment in Ireland is concentrated in the export sector,
again unlike New Zealand, particularly that investment in the modern sector.
Foreign firms operating in Ireland export over 85% of their gross output, with
72.8% of these exports going to EU members.  US-owned firms export 96% of
their output, with 74% of that going to the EU28.  In 1991 the share of total
exports of the modern sector increased to 62%, with computer hardware and
software alone accounting for 29%.
Who Is Investing?
United States firms are the most important investors with respect to the value of
investment, number of firms, and number of people employed.  This may well
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28  Barry and Bradley (1997)52
be a function of the number of Irish people that have moved to the US in the
past.  There is certainly a strong cultural link that has been forged between
these two countries.  The US firms entered the Irish market relatively early, in
the 1970’s, with investment in the electronic and pharmaceutical industries.
Half of the total foreign investment since 1983 has been by US firms.  The
United Kingdom and Germany are the next biggest investors, followed by the
Netherlands and France.  This suggests that access to the EU is not the only
driver of FDI inflows to Ireland, as these four countries are already able to
access that market due to their membership status.  Nonetheless, Ireland’s
membership of the EU is important as these European countries may well have
invested elsewhere had Ireland not had duty-free access to the European
market29.  Indeed, Ireland has now become part of an EU-wide integrated
manufacturing system.
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1988-92 average % of total
Source:  OECD (1994)
Note:  Excludes Shannon Free Airport industrial zone
                                           
29  It is interesting to note that the OECD’s reasons for negligible Japanese investment
include Ireland’s small domestic market and its location on the periphery of the European
mainland.  They then comment that Japanese investors seem to give particular value to being
close to large markets, which seems at odds with their previous statement.  Japanese
investment in the EU constituted 18.3% of total outward Japanese FDI in 1992 (Bora 1996).  It
may be that Japanese investors focus on longer term issues rather than short term incentives,
or perhaps they have had bad experiences in the past?53
In terms of numbers of firms, in 1992 the US dominated with 387 firms
operating in Ireland, equating to 38.2%.  The UK had 19.8%, Germany 14.6%,
Netherlands 5.5%, and Other countries accounted for the residual 21.8%.
Employment in the Foreign Sector...
Regarding employment, the OECD notes that the level of employment in areas
such as financial services may be quite small, as they are at an early stage of
development.  In more mature industries where there has been FDI over a
longer period of time, there is a higher level of employment.  For instance, in the
electronics sector there are over 250 firms employing more than 25000 people
generating a quarter of Ireland’s manufactured exports.
Industrial employment in Ireland is very dependent on foreign owned
companies:  as at 1992 half the employment in the industrial sector and 75% of
its output were attributed to foreign firms.  The following chart shows the
percentage of employment in various sectors that is accounted for by foreign
firms.









































































































































































































Source:  OECD (1994)54
The average level of foreign firm employment in these sectors in 1992 was
44.8%, with 94200 out of 210400 employees working for a foreign firm.  Barry
and Bradley (1997) note that a large proportion of employment in the foreign
owned sector of Irish manufacturing is in high technology sectors, and this fits
with the fact that skill levels are higher in foreign industry than in indigenous
industry.
It is worth noting that any expansion of activity in the modern sector has a flow-
on effect in the service sector due to the linkages created by such activity.
Multinational companies’ purchases of Irish inputs are only a small proportion of
their total sales, but in terms of purchases of domestic services per employee, it
is higher than for indigenous firms.  The OECD notes that the number of jobs in
the service sector indirectly linked to those in the modern manufacturing sector
was estimated to be 105% of direct employees in the modern manufacturing
sector.  This compared with only 80% in traditional manufacturing industries.  In
addition this link has become stronger over time while it has fallen or stayed the
same for the other sectors.
O hUallachain (1984) commented that foreign firms seem to be predominant in
sectors where linkages are relatively low in any case, and that the low level of
integration of foreign firms may be quite typical.  His study focused on the
purchase of inputs, and his results showed a consistent lack of relationship
between sectoral growth and inter-industry backward linkage.  He therefore
concluded that concern for improving linkages may be shortsighted given more
pressing policy objectives.  Perhaps a more important concern is that FDI may
be squeezing out domestic entrepreneurship, as it seems more profitable to
work for a foreign firm than to start up a firm.
Earnings in the Foreign Sector...
The average wage in foreign industry yielded an annual pay packet of £16,000
in 1993.  This was approximately 25% higher than in indigenous industry.
Looking just at industrial workers, the average wage in the foreign dominated
sectors of beverages/tobacco, segments of textiles, chemicals, and electrics
and optics (including computers) was £14,000 compared to an average for the
rest of manufacturing of around £12,00030.
Growth in manufacturing wages in general has been steady.  The average Irish
manufacturing wage is Ir£14,400, which equates to approximately NZ$36,900.
This compares to an average New Zealand manufacturing wage of NZ$34,100.
The chart below illustrates the growth in real hourly manufacturing earnings in
Ireland, compared with a steady decline in New Zealand.
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Source:  Calculated from OECD database, PCInfo
The following table examines manufacturing plants by nationality of ownership,
and clearly shows the divergence between indigenous and foreign firms in
wages paid, average size of plant, and output per employee.
Table 10:  Manufacturing Plants:  Characteristics by Ownership

























Irish 30.8 17.7 13.1 111167 1456288 28.8
Other EU 55.3 39.3 16.0 33345 533520 104.9
  - UK 71.2 52.8 18.4 12763 234839 114.0
  - Ger. 30.7 17.3 13.4 10866 145604 108.7
Non EU 116.4 100.1 16.3 55491 904503 149.2
  - US 126.2 109.8 16.4 42806 702018 160.3
Total
foreign
93.5 77.3 16.2 88836 1439143 128.7
Total 58.6 44.2 14.4 200003 2880043 44.0
Source:  Barry and Bradley (1997)56
Foreign plants are generally much larger than their Irish counterparts, with
higher net output per person and higher wages.  Of the foreign firms, those
originating in the US seem to have the largest plant size and highest output per
person.
Role of Government Incentives with FDI
A Pro-active Approach...
The Irish government has for many decades taken a pro-active approach to
attracting foreign direct investment.  After a rather inward looking period from
1921 to the mid-1950’s, Ireland turned to an outward-looking, export oriented
strategy of economic development, with the attraction of FDI stated as a
national economic policy objective31.  The Irish authorities believe incentives
are needed to attract foreign investment into Ireland because of its peripheral
location and small domestic market.  While they acknowledge that sound
economic policies, reliable infrastructure and a competitive workforce are
important, they feel that Ireland must offer a competitive investment package if it
wants to attract internationally mobile capital.  This is especially so in light of
increasing competition between nations for foreign investment32.
Supportive Irish Agencies...
There are a number of Irish agencies that focus on the development of industry,
which deal with incentives and support.  The Industrial Development Agency
(IDA Ireland) is an institution that concentrates solely on foreign investment
promotion.  This body was created under the Industrial Development Bill 1993,
out of an agency called simply IDA which had been established in 1969 to
promote general industrial development in Ireland33.  The refocusing of policy
was very influenced by work from such contributors as Michael Porter.  The new
IDA seeks to attract “internationally mobile projects which can operate
competitively and profitably from Ireland”.
Priority sectors identified by the IDA are:
• electronics (semiconductors, PC systems, peripherals, communications);
• engineering (automotive components, aerospace, industrial electronics);
• healthcare (including pharmaceuticals, chemicals, medical devices and
hospital products);
                                           
31  Cunningham, W.T.   (1996)
32  OECD (1994) pg. 33
33  OECD (1994) pg. 3957
• consumer products (sports and leisure, personal care products, fashion);
• financial services (banking, mutual funds, corporate treasury, insurance);
and
• international services (teleservices, software, multimedia, centralised
administration).
The first three priority sectors are high-tech areas, where the IDA hopes that the
transfer of technology and skills will be large.  The other three sectors are
encouraged more for their employment creation effects.  Particular firms within
these six sectors are also evaluated for their export potential.
The IDA markets Ireland as an attractive location for foreign investment through
its network of offices at home and abroad, with 14 overseas offices in 8
countries and 8 regional offices in Ireland.  They emphasise the stability and
growing competitiveness of the Irish economy (stable political and economic
environment, stable currency, low inflation), the favorable tax regime, financial
incentives, good skills base, and active participation in Europe, that is,
accentuating the fact that they are on the periphery of a huge market and can
access it duty free.  The IDA currently has an annual budget of Ir£120 million
(US$165 million), of which around Ir£50 million (US$69 million) goes to new
foreign firms in the form of grants.
Another facet of the support for foreign industry is the Shannon Free Airport
Development Company.  This company administers the Shannon Free Zone, an
industrial zone which includes an airport.  This company aids export oriented
businesses by offering packages to those firms setting up in the free zone.
There are certain conditions for operating within the zone however, and firms
need to get a license from the Minister of Enterprise and Employment.
An important centre is the International Financial Services Centre (IFSC), which
was set up in 1987 mainly to attract investment in the financial services area,
but also partly as an attempt to assist the re-development of the Dublin
docklands area.  Firms operating within this centre are eligible to take
advantage of the variety of incentives offered to foreign investment in Ireland.
The advent of the centre has significantly increased the number of banking and
financial institutions operating in Ireland.  In 1994 Dublin was the base for 237
international financial companies.
Recent Refocusing Of Incentives...
There has been a reorientation of industrial policy towards indigenous
enterprises since the early 1990’s, due to government concern that local
businesses were lagging behind the international sector.  Indeed Ireland has
found itself in a dual economy type situation where there is a dynamic foreign
owned sector and a slower growing traditional sector comprised of small Irish
firms.  There is increasing anecdotal evidence that foreign investment is
squeezing out domestic industry, due to skills shortages and resource58
constraints.  Nevertheless, FDI continues to flow in despite evidence of labour
shortages, wage pressures and an overheating economy.  For example, Xerox
has recently entered Ireland and employed 2000 people.
The reorientation of policy comprises of a plan to use repayable equity rather
than grants for local firms, and an ‘industrial cluster’ idea where the government
identifies ‘promising niches’ in which Ireland ‘seems to have a comparative
advantage’ and directly supports firms entering those niches34.  Schemes which
‘pick winners’ have the potential to be very distortionary and inefficient, with
evidence from several countries showing that governments can often be
incorrect in their assessment of ‘promising niches’.
Nevertheless, in order to facilitate these ideas, an agency called Forbairt was
established at the same time as the IDA, with the purpose of providing state
support services to indigenous Irish industry.  Its aim is to help Irish firms
become more competitive and achieve growth, and to encourage the
establishment of more Irish firms.  Support is provided across a range of
commercial activities including management, product development, finance,
and technical services.
The Irish authorities have said that this new focus on Irish enterprise
development will not negatively affect foreign enterprises wishing to establish or
expand in the Irish market, and that foreign firms will continue to receive
support, particularly where the prospects for new job creation are high.
Tax Incentives...
Tax incentives have been one of the main carrots for overseas investors
considering putting their money in Ireland.  In 1956 Ireland introduced a
corporate tax exemption of 50% for exports of goods manufactured in the area.
By 1957 this had been extended to full exemption, with firms being able to
access this benefit for up to 20 years under the applicable legislation.  However,
when Ireland joined the then EEC they were pressured to end the scheme, and
so it expired in 1990 under the legislation.  A look-alike scheme for the Shannon
Free Airport Zone was subject to the same treatment.
Nevertheless, there are still sizeable tax reliefs available, notably the 10% tax
rate which has existed since 1981, and in essence replaces the export sales tax
exemption.  The 10% rate is available for:
• “manufacturing” as defined in the legislation;
• “relevant trading operations” carried on within the Shannon Airport Zone;
and
• international financial services carried on in the Dublin Custom House Docks
Area.
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The Irish Government has just reached an agreement with the European
Commission to introduce a single corporate tax rate of 12.5% by January 1,
2003.  This rate will apply to all firms, foreign and domestic, and so will
eliminate the preferential treatment given to foreign corporates under current
corporate tax rules.  However, the agreement can be viewed as a victory for the
Irish Government as there were concerns that the EU would demand much
higher tax rates.
Both Shannon and the Financial Centre offer tax depreciation on plant and
machinery at rates of up to 100%, so tax depreciation can be offset against
profit to reduce taxable earnings.  There are also property tax advantages from
setting up in the IFSC.  Additionally, a foreign branch exemption was introduced
in the Finance Act of 1995 which allows profits earned outside Ireland by
branches of qualifying Irish resident companies to be exempt from tax.  This
was in order to encourage large international groups to establish regional
operational headquarters in Ireland.  There is also a 400% tax deduction for
qualifying expenditure on research and development, which is available to those
companies eligible for the 10% tax rate, and which can be utilised over a three-
year period.  There are conditions however, relating to capital and employment.
And Grants Too...
There are of course non-tax incentives as well.  Grants are the most common
incentive used, with almost 80% of foreign firms’ new startups in Ireland being
grant-aided.  The IDA targets industries on the basis of growth potential
especially in international markets, technological  content, and quality of
employment.  Individual projects are then assessed for grant purposes
according to the number and kind of jobs created and maintained, the value
added, and the product’s general export potential.  In addition, the IDA must be
satisfied that the project needs state funding, is commercially viable, and that
the firm has an adequate equity base and a suitable company development
plan.  Projects must provide new employment or maintain employment that
would not be maintained without public assistance, and increase output and
value added in the economy.
Capital grants provide cash towards the cost of fixed assets for start-up and
expansion projects.  In areas of the country designated as ‘disadvantaged’ the
grants can fund up to 60% of the fixed asset start-up costs, while in other parts
of the country up to 45% support is available.  For expansion projects the limit is
15% nation-wide, although special incentives may be negotiated for very large
projects.  Grants are non-repayable except in special circumstances such as
wind-up of the firm or disposal of the grant-aided assets.  The project’s return to
the economy is taken into consideration when deciding the level of grant aid.
Qualifying assets include buildings, site development, building modification, and
other project related equipment.60
Training grants are usually given for greenfield projects.  They allow 100% of
the costs of training operatives to be funded in start-up companies, and up to
50% for existing firms.  The grants can cover the cost of trainees’ wages during
their training in Ireland, and can cover the travelling expenses, wages and living
costs of workers trained outside Ireland.  Management training and the cost of
instructors may also be covered, as are the costs of approved training courses.
Training grants are not usually given alongside employment grants.
Employment grants allow employers in the manufacturing, services or
agriculture industries to obtain a payment for increasing their workforce over a
base level of employees.  These grants are available for up to 24 weeks at a
time, with the level of grant varying with the kind of employment being created.
Research and development grants give financial aid of up to 50% of the
expenditure on consultants, wages, travel, living costs, patents, prototypes and
technical assistance, with a maximum of IR£250 000 per project or Ir£500 000
per company.
Feasibility study grants give financial aid of up to 50% of expenditure on wages,
expenses, travel, consulting and prototypes on projects such as market
research, input sourcing studies, and the preparation of financial projections.
This wide range of grants are administered at the discretion of the IDA, and
their level has ensured that Ireland has been one of the most intensive givers of
grants to industry in the EC35.  The OECD suggests that over the 1980’s the
Irish government distributed a cumulative Ir£960 million (or nearly US$1.5 billion
in current dollars) in grant aid.
Other assistance...
Apart from the attractive tax rate and the grant system, the IDA also provides
other incentives to encourage foreign investors to establish or expand in
Ireland.  These incentives include the provision of office and building sites,
situated on the IDA’s some 2500 acres of industrial sites nation-wide.  The IDA
also constructs factories and offices so that accommodation for new
manufacturing and service industries is available.  Rent subsidies are available
as alternatives to capital grants, with the current maximum level of aid being a
60% subsidy for up to five years.  Reduced rentals may also be negotiated.  In
addition, foreign firms have access to support programmes which provide
industrial promotion and assistance including technical and marketing support.
Cost competition...
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The wide range of grants and assistance programmes certainly enable foreign
firms to offset or reduce many of their costs in the early years, and provide
attractive incentives to invest in Ireland.  It is interesting to note that for much of
the 1950’s-80’s, grants were focused on capital rather than labour.  This meant
that those labour-intensive firms that did arrive during this period, for example
assembly firms, often left due to the higher cost vis-a-vis Asia.  Once grants
became more labour focused this problem was partly resolved.
In the future though, Ireland will face increasing competition for FDI from
emerging economies in Eastern and Central Europe, such as the Czech
Republic and Hungary.  As wage costs rise in Ireland due to labour shortages,
and congestion rises, these emerging economies will look more and more
attractive as low cost European producers.  This is particularly so for the Czech
Republic and Hungary as they are near the front of the queue to join the EU,
and they already have bilateral agreements with the EU nations.  It will be
interesting to see if Ireland can maintain the flows of FDI that it experiences at
the moment into the future.
The New Zealand Approach...
New Zealand operates a fairly hands-off policy towards foreign investment.  The
Overseas Investment Commission has statutory powers to regulate foreign
investment, but the majority of applications are approved.  There are special
conditions related to the sale of land, and ‘strategic’ assets are out-of-bounds,
as detailed in the Coalition Agreement.  Beyond this though, New Zealand has
no real mechanisms operating to influence either the type or the sectoral
destination of foreign investment inflows.  There are certainly no official
incentives for firms entering New Zealand.  There is thus a marked difference
between Ireland and New Zealand’s treatment of foreign capital.62
7. SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT
Total Economy...
The early 1980’s in Ireland was characterised by a shortfall of domestic savings
relative to capital formation, as reflected in the large current account deficit.  By
the end of the decade the savings less investment (S-I) relationship had turned
positive, mainly due to a decline in investment rather than an increase in
aggregate savings.
The chart below depicts savings and investment for the whole economy for both
Ireland and New Zealand.  It is notable that Irish gross fixed capital formation
has been declining since 1980.  Savings increased by 6 percentage points
between 1980-90, but has remained fairly steady from 1990 onwards.  For New
Zealand the story is rather different.  Gross fixed capital formation has
consistently, with the exception of one year, exceeded savings, although the
relationship has become closer towards the end of the period36.




















Source: Irish Central Statistics Office, and PCInfos
Note:  GNS (Gross National Savings), and GFCF (Gross Fixed Capital Formation)
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It is interesting to note that gross fixed capital formation in New Zealand has
generally exceeded that in Ireland since the early 1980’s, yet Ireland has
experienced such rapid growth.  Indeed, surprise has been expressed by some
that the growth in Ireland followed a decline in investment.  Leddin and Walsh
(1997) suggest the puzzle may be explained by the altered structure of the
investment, with the share of private investment, predominantly FDI, in total
investment growing.  The higher productivity of this private investment is
reflected by a lower incremental capital/output ratio, as compared to public
sector investment.
Leddin and Walsh also suggest that perhaps the earlier public investment in
infrastructure, both physical and social, had a long gestation period and is now
enhancing the private sector investment productivity.  Certainly public
investment in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s was high, and was focused
mainly in infrastructure and utilities.  Manufacturing investment in that time
tended to be capital-intensive, and the heavy investment in utilities has left a
legacy of excess capacity that is not yet fully utilised.  The IMF (1996a) note
that recent investment is less capital-intensive, especially that in the modern
sector, and is far more productive, particularly with the increase in skilled
workers.
It therefore seems that the quality of investment is an important issue to think
about when analysing the saving/investment behaviour within an economy.
Looking only at the levels of investment may over-simplify the relationships
between investment and other variables, for example the current account.  With
investment in New Zealand higher than that in Ireland, yet growth much lower, it
could suggest that the quality of New Zealand investment may be lacking.  The
sectoral composition of investment and the availability of other resources such
as skilled labour, are obviously other important factors though.  The figures also
suggest that perhaps the focus on the savings/investment behaviour of New
Zealanders is overemphasised, since the numbers are relatively close to those
of Ireland yet the outcomes are quite different.64
The Government Sector...
The figures for the total economy mask the behaviour of savings and
investment for particular groups within Ireland.  Looking first at government
investment, it is notable that as a percentage of GNP it fell from 6.1% in 1980 to
2.4% in 1990.  The Irish government reduced investment expenditure in line
with attempts at fiscal consolidation, both in the early 1980’s and in 1987.  The
1987 consolidation was more effective at reducing the deficit due to the
expenditure constraint approach rather than the tax increase approach, thus
decreasing public sector dis-saving quite sharply.





















Source:  Central Statistics Office
The Household Sector...
It is noticeable that as public savings have increased (that is, the public sector
deficit decreased) the private sector savings fell.  For instance, in 1980 the
government sector savings were -5.6% of GNP, while household sector savings
were 16% of GNP.  In contrast, in 1990 government sector savings were -0.9%
of GNP while household sector savings were 9.6% of GNP.  This suggests a
Ricardian Equivalence type relationship between private and public savings,65
whereby private sector savings fall in response to an increase in public sector
saving as it suggests lower tax liability in the future.  The moderation of growth
in real wages (perhaps via wage agreements) is also suggested to have had a
negative impact on savings.  The chart below illustrates the fall in savings in the
household sector, along with the relatively static trend of investment.
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Source:  Central Statistics Office
Household saving is higher in Ireland than in New Zealand, but it is interesting
to note that the OECD talks about the historical Irish preference for holding
property assets.  In fact, the high rate of home ownership has been identified as
one of the reasons why the Irish stock market is relatively undeveloped37.
Demand for housing has also been fuelled by tax system incentives.  The
recent growth in Ireland has additionally increased demand for housing
mortgages, with the real estate and construction sector accounting for more
than half of the increase in credit to the domestic private sector38.  Residential
construction as a percentage of GDP was hovering around 5% for both Ireland
and New Zealand in 1995.
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The Business Sector...
With respect to the business sector, Walsh (1996) states that private spending
on domestic capital formation declined when the level of foreign direct
investment in the economy was increasing, and that this meant Irish companies
were investing more and more outside the country.  Certainly investment has
been on a downward trend, particularly since around 1980.  The IMF suggest
that this was partly a result of exchange restrictions being lifted and businesses
being able to diversify and expand abroad in response to the small domestic
market size and peripheral location.  Rising real interest rates in the 1980’s may
also have deterred investment.  Recently strong economic growth has arrested
the sharp fall in investment, although it is still lower than the EU/OECD
average39.






















Source:  Central Statistics Office
The increase in business sector saving can be attributed to a marked
improvement in profitability, coinciding with wage moderation and productivity
increases resulting from structural changes in the manufacturing sector.  The
IMF comments that the failure of investment to increase with profitability can
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again be attributed to the small market size.  This may be a problem that New
Zealand faces also.68
8. CURRENT ACCOUNT
The current account has been one of the major ‘success stories’ in Ireland.
Coming from a large current account deficit in the early 1980’s Ireland now has
a sizable current account surplus.  This sharp turnaround is illustrated in the
chart below.















































































































Source:  World Bank database, PCInfos
However, one point to note with the Irish current account data is that the
method of classifying the activities of foreign multinationals and firms in the
IFSC may exaggerate the size of the surplus.  The IMF suggests that these
distortions may overstate the current account surplus by as much as one-third.
Nevertheless, the sharp turnaround in the current account in the 1980’s cannot
be simply explained by this alone, hence the interest in the underlying
components of the account.69
Trade Performance...
The improvement in the current account stemmed partly from the dramatic
improvement in trade performance, illustrated in the chart below.  From 1979 to
1995 the visible trade balance moved from a deficit equivalent to 17% of GDP
to a 19% surplus, due mainly to the growth of exports40.  This may be due to
the government policy of attracting FDI, which was directed into dynamic,
export-oriented sectors.














































































































Source:  World Bank database, PCInfos.
The composition of merchandise trade also altered, with high-tech sectors
making a large contribution to the growth.  In terms of the Standard Industrial
Trade Classification (SITC) classes, while SITC 0 (Food and Live Animals) grew
93% between 1987 and 1995, SITC 5 (Chemicals) grew 322% over the same
period.  Pharmaceuticals, which comes under SITC 5, was a notable performer,
with growth of 458% over the 9 year period.  SITC 7 (Machinery and Transport
Equipment) grew 201%, with one of its high-tech components, Office
Equipment, growing at 179%41.  Walsh (1996) notes that a small number of
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non-traditional, high-tech sectors, including organic chemicals and
pharmaceuticals, contributed disproportionately to the boom in exports.  He also
comments that these sectors are controlled in the main by Irish subsidiaries of
multinational firms, with75.6% of all manufacturing exports originating from
foreign firms in 1993.
Services...
Trade in services has also grown, although imports of services still far outweigh
exports.  Nevertheless, exports of services have picked up, particularly since
1989, which could be attributed to the International Financial Services Centre
beginning to operate at a normal level, since it only opened in 1987.












































































































Source:  World Bank database, PCInfos.71
Factor Income Flows...
Apart from trade in goods and services, the current account also incorporates
factor income flows.  The new Irish system of national income accounting,
which implements some of the methodological changes recommended in the
new European System of National and Regional Accounts, treats the entire
profits of an Irish-based multinational as a factor income outflow in the current
account.  Reinvested profits are then treated as an inflow on the capital
account.  Factor income outflows have been far greater than inflows in recent
years, no doubt reflecting the level of foreign activity in the economy.  Factor
income inflows have been static however.















































































































Source:  World Bank database, PCInfos.72
Transfers...
The final component of the current account is transfers, both official and private.
The dominant feature of this category is transfers from the European Union,
which include subsidies to particular areas such as agriculture, and payments
towards infrastructure and regional development.  These transfers are large, for
example, in 1992 the total EU transfers as a percentage of GDP were 5.7%.
However, Ireland’s share of EU structural funds is likely to be reduced
significantly in the next round of EU funding.































































Source:  World Bank database, PCInfos.
Leddin and Walsh comment that there is evidence among a few small countries
that have received an exceptionally large volume of aid (generally more than
15% of GDP) that there is a high correlation between aid and investment.  That
is, these countries are directing aid money into infrastructure projects and the
like, rather than consumable items.  They note the possibility that EU assistance
to Ireland falls into this category of effective, growth promoting assistance42.
However, since around 75% of the transfer money is channeled into the
agricultural sector, in particular CAP subsidies, it seems unlikely that these
transfers have had a large influence on growth.  It is more likely that the transfer
money has simply sustained the agricultural sector at a larger level than it
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otherwise would be at.  It may also have created some demand for sectors that
serve the agricultural sector.
Current Account Components...
The 1997 OECD report on Ireland gives components of the current account as
percentages of GNP as follows:
Table 11:  The Current Account 1991-95 (% of GNP)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Trade balance 8.1 13.0 16.8 17.3 21.3
Royalties -1.9 -2.4 -3.1 -3.9 -4.5
Other services -0.8 -2.1 -1.6 -2.6 -3.4
Factor incomes
Company earnings -9.2 -10.7 -11.1 -11.2 -14.4
National debt interest -4.0 -3.4 -3.5 -3.5 -3.0
Other factor incomes 2.3 2.2 2.4 3.2 3.2
Current transfers 6.3 4.6 4.6 3.7 3.3
Current account
balance
0.8 1.2 4.3 3.1 2.7
Source:  OECD (1997)
This highlights the importance of trade to the Irish economy, and also the size of
the outflows of company earnings.  The other point to note is that the Irish
current account balance would be slightly negative without the current transfers
(predominantly EU transfers).  Nevertheless, the turnaround in the account has
not been driven by transfers, since they have been at a high level for many
years, not just since the mid 1980’s.
Taking a Savings/Investment Perspective
One way to look at the current account is to regard the balance as national
saving less domestic investment.  The dramatic turnaround of Ireland’s current
account could therefore be interpreted as reflecting changes in the
saving/investment behaviour within Ireland.74
The previous section on saving and investment outlined the various trends that
have emerged recently in Ireland.  Most notable were the decline in public
sector dis-saving accompanied by fairly static private43 sector saving, and the
drop in both government and business investment.  The view of the IMF
(1996b) is that fiscal consolidation, higher business sector saving due to higher
profitability, and declining domestic investment were the main contributing
factors in Ireland’s current account turnaround.
The IMF further note that a number of structural factors that underlie
saving/investment behaviour may be important in understanding the current
account, including the stage of development, changes in the terms of trade,
demographics, and fiscal policy.  They find that the current account balance is
positively related to the level of income in Ireland relative to that of the USA,
that is, as Ireland has matured the need to run a deficit to build up capital stock
has declined.  The fiscal consolidation was also found to be a significant
positive influence on the current account.  With respect to demographics, a
lower dependency ratio may have helped to improve the current account as it
allows greater savings.  Indeed, total economy savings have been on an
upward trend since around 1980 (although admittedly this is mainly due to
business saving and less government dis-saving).
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9. UNEMPLOYMENT
Walsh (1996) notes that even though Ireland experienced the fastest rate of
expansion of employment in Europe between 1985-95, it was still not adequate
to absorb all of the high natural growth rate of the labour force and the outflow
from farming.  With a birth rate peaking in 1980, the ratio of school leavers to
population is much higher than in the rest of the EU.  Female participation rates
have risen substantially, and net immigration has been increasing.
Nevertheless, these factors have served to increase the pool of available labour
in the economy, and have been crucial in dampening down labour market
pressures in recent years.  However their influence is declining of late, and
there are indications that labour costs are rising.
The fact that unemployment is still so high after 10 years of rapid growth points
to a severe hysteresis problem in Walsh’s view.  This view is shared by
Santaella (1994) in his paper on Irish unemployment.  He comments that the
unemployment rate has reached a new maximum at every business cycle
trough bar one since the 1970’s, and during peaks it has never fallen below the
corresponding level for the previous peak.  The fact that low points in the
business cycle seem to have had permanent effects on the rate of
unemployment is commonly taken as evidence of hysteresis.

























































 Source:  OECD Outlook, PCInfos76
Long-Term Unemployment...
Ireland’s main problem is with long-term unemployment, rather than short-term
unemployment.
Table 12:  Long-term unemployment (1995)
Unemployed
as % of labour force
Workers unemployed more
than 1 year











Ireland 4.7 7.5 12.2 49.4 63.7 58.2
New
Zealand
4.9 1.4 6.3 18.0 26.8 22.9
Source:  OECD (1997)
Long-term unemployment rose during the difficult years in the 1980’s, rose
further in recessions, and simply stabilised during upturns.  Almost 60% of the
unemployed in 1995 had been out of work for over a year, which reduces the
probability of finding a job quite significantly.
Long-term unemployment is most prevalent amongst men, particularly older
ones, as their relatively lower level of education does not favour them in the job
market.  Since traditional sectors have downsized, and more high-tech or
service jobs are emerging, these older workers are at a disadvantage compared
to the group of young well-educated workers entering the labour force.  The
long-term unemployed are unlikely to be able to ease Ireland’s labour shortage,
as their education and skills are simply insufficient.  The long-term unemployed
also contains a large group of people looking for their first job, and typically
these people left school with no qualifications.  Short-term unemployment is a
relatively greater problem for youth though.77
Table 13:  Unemployment by duration (% of total unemployment), 1995
Less than 1
year
1-2 years 2 years +
Male 33.1 16.7 50.2
15-24 yrs old 49.1 20.6 30.3
25+ yrs old 27.1 15.2 57.7
Female 47.7 20.3 32.0
15-24 yrs old 55.9 21.5 22.6
25+ yrs old 43.8 19.8 36.4
Total 38.5 18.1 43.4
15-24 yrs old 51.9 20.9 27.2
25+ yrs old 33.2 16.8 50.0
Source:  OECD (1997).  Note that the figure for long-term unemployment differs
from the previous chart - this is due to different data sources being used by the
OECD.
The long-term unemployment problem is geographically concentrated in certain
areas of Dublin, Cork and Limerick, which also experience high rates of crime
and drug abuse.  However, unemployment rates for Ireland’s eight regions were
grouped within 3 percentage points of the national average in 1995.
Participation Rates...
In addition to high unemployment, Ireland also has relatively low participation
rates.  In 1995, 63% of the 15-64 age group was economically active, compared
with the OECD average of 71%.  This is predominantly due to the relatively low
rate of female participation ￿ 48% in 1995 compared with the OECD average
of 62%.  Young females have a low participation rate due to higher numbers
gaining tertiary education, while older woman have typically taken early
retirement.  Even so, the female participation rate has risen, as more education
encourages woman to seek work.  Changing attitudes to woman at work, and
declining fertility rates have also increased the female participation rate.
The male participation rate is a little below the OECD average, mostly due to
the increasing numbers of young men seeking tertiary education.  Older men
have also retired early, due to declining demand for older less-educated
workers and the increased availability of pensions and welfare as they approach
retirement age.78
Migration...
Ireland has also experienced large levels of emigration in response to
conditions in the domestic labour market as compared to labour markets
overseas44.  This of course means that the level or rate of unemployment does
not accurately reflect labour market conditions in Ireland.  The United Kingdom
is a particularly popular destination for Irish workers, especially given the lack of
controls and the proximity, common language, and number of Irish people
already living there.  As such, it seems that the Irish and UK unemployment
rates seem to follow similar trends.  The US is also a popular destination.
Most migrants that leave Ireland are young, educated people who go abroad to
find work or take up employment, leading to the concern of ‘brain-drain’.
However, over half of migrants return to Ireland, and this is particularly
encouraged by the fact that employers have appeared to like hiring graduates
with overseas work experience, rather than recent graduates in Ireland.  This
may not be the case so much any more though, considering the increasing
skills shortages in Ireland.
Figure 30:  International Migration (% labour force)
Addressing Unemployment...
In order to help address the problem of unemployment the Training and
Employment  Authority (FAS) was established in 1988 under the Labour
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Services Act 1987.  Its functions are to oversee the operation of training and
employment/recruitment services, run an advisory service for industry, and to
provide support for co-operative and community based enterprise.  The agency
is run by a wide collection of people representing trade unions;  employer and
youth interests; and the Departments of Education, Finance, Enterprise Trade
and Employment, Social Community and Family Affairs.  Active labour market
programmes are also run by the Department of Social Welfare.  Total
expenditure by all agencies on these programmes totalled £698.2 million in
199545.
Looking at the impact of taxes and benefits on incentives is also a priority of the
Irish government.  Reducing the high marginal tax rate, changing the rules of
the unemployment benefit to strengthen work incentives, reforming the child
benefits system which currently favours the unemployed, and improving the
system of housing related benefits, were all suggestions made to Ireland under
the OECD Jobs Study in this area.
Another area which has been suggested as needing addressing is the
institutional features of the labour market, in particular the method of wage
bargaining, which some say has resulted in the Irish labour market becoming
too inflexible to react to changes in the environment.  Santaella notes that the
wage agreements have helped to preserve a rigid structure of relative wages
that may not correspond to productivity differentials and structural changes
occurring in the economy.  This could well prove to be a large constraint on
growth in the future.
Unemployment and Education...
Sheehan notes that in 1980, those leaving school with no qualifications had an
unemployment rate of around 20%, those with intermediate/group certificate
(NZ School Certificate level) had a rate of just under 10%, while those with
leaving certificate (NZ UE level) had an unemployment rate of around 5%.  By
1991, the data looks a little different, with those with no qualifications having
around 53% unemployment, intermediate/group certificate with a rate of just
over 30% and those with leaving certificate with a rate of around 11%.
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The OECD 1997 report on Ireland provides detailed information for 1995 on the
unemployment rate by level of education.















U/e rate by level
of education
Primary 45.5 31.6 24.5 15.5 9.1 1.9 19.0
Lower secondary 27.6 19.1 12.6 10.0 9.7 6.4 17.3
Upper secondary 14.6 7.8 6.1 5.9 6.8 2.7 9.5
3rd level, non-uni 9.6 5.2 4.0 5.6 3.2 0.0 5.9
University 8.5 4.4 3.1 2.8 2.5 0.0 4.0
Total 19.4 11.3 11.0 10.2 7.7 2.4 12.1
Share of the u/e
Primary 4.9 5.1 7.8 7.9 2.9 0.2 28.8
Lower secondary 12.1 11.1 7.8 3.9 1.4 0.2 36.4
Upper secondary 10.6 6.8 4.7 1.9 0.7 0.1 24.8
3
rd level, non-uni 2.2 1.9 1.1 0.7 0.2 0.0 6.1
University 0.9 1.5 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.0 3.8
Total 30.6 26.4 22.3 14.9 5.4 0.5 100.0
Source:  OECD (1997)81
The figures show that unemployment is concentrated among persons with only
a primary or lower secondary school education, in fact 65.2% of unemployment
comes from this group.  Of concern must be the fact that this group accounts for
about half of the labour force in 1995, as detailed in the table below.
Table 15:  Unemployment and the rise in educational qualifications
U/e rate Highest level of educational
qualifications
1995 1989 1991 1992 1994 1995
% of labour force
aged 25-64
% of population aged 25-64
Primary 18.6 36.9 33.2 31.7 28.1 26.9
Lower secondary 14.7 25.2 26.6 26.1 26.7 25.9
Upper secondary 7.6 23.2 24.3 25.3 26.7 27.3
3
rd level, non-uni 4.9 7.4 7.9 8.6 9.7 9.8
University 3.5 7.3 8.0 8.3 8.8 10.1
Weighted u/e rate 12.9 12.6 12.3 11.9 11.7
Source:  OECD (1997)
Note:  The weighted unemployment rate weights the 1995 unemployment rate
for each education level by the share of the population aged 25-64 with that
educational level.
It seems that despite the improvements in the education system in recent years,
there is still a problem with youth unemployment, with 30.6% of 15-24 year olds
being unemployed in 1995.  Generally though, those persons that complete
tertiary level education do experience a far lower rate of unemployment,
particularly once they reach the 25+ age group.
The proportion of the labour force with only primary education fell dramatically
from 36.9% in 1989 to 26.9% in 1995, reflecting the retirement of many people
who completed their education before the introduction of free secondary
schooling in 1968.  The share with tertiary education had risen to nearly 20%,
and the OECD report suggests that rising education levels have reduced
structural unemployment in Ireland, together with other factors such as changes
in the tax and benefit systems which increased work incentives.82
10. EDUCATION
According to the IMD World Competitiveness Report, 1996, Ireland has an
exceptional availability of skilled people, and has the most relevant educational
system in Europe for a competitive economy.
The following table, extracted from a table in OECD (1997) shows the
educational attainment in Ireland and New Zealand in 1994.
Table 16:  Educational Attainment (% of population 25-64 years of age by the highest











Uni-level education 9 9
Total 100 100
Govt spending on





Source:  OECD (1997), The Treasury
It can be seen from this table that the educational attainment in New Zealand is
slightly higher than that in Ireland.  Nevertheless, much emphasis has been put
on education in Ireland, both by the government and by families.  Private
provision adds a great deal to the education of Irish people, through such
means as private tuition, ‘swot’ classes and so on.  Since education has
traditionally been a passport to overseas opportunities, there has been a strong
entrenchment of positive attitudes towards academic study.  Young people work
extremely hard to achieve good grades, in order to be accepted into sought-
after tertiary places.
In the early 1980’s a debate was emerging about the economic relevance of
education, particularly its importance for employment.  Some groups felt the
education system was producing too many people trained in the ‘liberal arts and
traditional professions’, with not enough emphasis being placed on vocational
skills46.  However, a document produced by the government, the 1992 Green
Paper on Education, took a broader view of what is vocationally relevant.  It
                                           
46  Sheehan (1992) notes these comments taken from the Report of the Industrial Policy
review Group.83
generally suggested that new subjects such as Business and Technology
Studies should be encouraged, vocational programmes should be widened, and
links with business should be further developed.  Certainly there is now a strong
emphasis on ‘technical universities’ and on developing industry-related courses.































Source:  Sheehan (1992), Education Statistics of NZ (1993) pg79.
Clearly Arts has a large share of total graduates in both countries.  Sheehan
notes that Arts in Ireland experienced an increase in students in the late 1980’s
due to the tightening of budgets.  This precluded the expansion of expensive
laboratory and work-shop based programmes.  He also notes that most of the
increase was focused in modern continental languages, economics, and other
‘vocationally relevant’ areas.  It is obvious however that Ireland is ahead of New
Zealand in terms of students in engineering and science.  In fact the IDA states
that 6 out of 10 of Ireland’s 3
rd level students major in engineering, science or
business studies subjects.  As mentioned earlier, there is an emphasis in
Ireland on technical subjects.84
11. FUTURE PROSPECTS
Ireland’s future is uncertain, but there are some indications of what may be
round the corner.
With strong growth in the economy, Ireland is starting to see fairly large asset
price bubbles.  Workers are demanding higher pay, and there are signs of
skilled labour shortages.  In addition, the output gap measuring the difference
between actual GDP and potential GDP is strongly positive.  However, there are
limited options for addressing overheating due to the imminent EU currency
union.  The job of restraining demand is left mainly to fiscal policy ￿ tax
increases and spending cuts would serve to quickly dampen down the
economy.  But in fact, planned spending is to increase by 6% this year, and
taxes have been lowered.  Nevertheless, it seems fairly likely that the Irish
government will have to change its fiscal stance in response to the current
environment.
Putting the relatively short-term issue of overheating to one side, there are other
concerns that Ireland faces.  The first revolves around the imminent currency
union in Europe.  As mentioned in the section on monetary policy, there are
worries that geographically peripheral countries such as Ireland will be
marginalised in policy decisions.  This may lead to policies being put in place
that will benefit the core, rather than the periphery.  Now given that Ireland is
fairly dependent on exports of hi-tech items, any slowdown in demand in this
area will have severe negative consequences for the economy.  Without the
prospect of exchange rate movements to offset such a shock, and with interest
rates likely set to levels that suit countries such as Germany and France,
Ireland would have to rely on internal adjustment.  This means that labour and
goods markets must be flexible enough to cope.
Another issue mentioned earlier in the paper is that of labour market pressures.
Not only are wage demands increasing due to the recent growth in the
economy, but the favourable labour force growth trends exhibited in recent
years are likely to subside in the medium term ￿ meaning more pressure on
wages.  There are also growing shortages of skilled labour.  In the future then it
is likely that labour force growth will be much slower, and wages will rise to
reflect the reduced availability of labour, both skilled and unskilled.  This may
affect the competitiveness of Ireland, particularly as compared to emerging East
European nations.
Finally, it could be suggested that some of Ireland’s economic policies will need
attention in the future.  For example, the tax system is very complex, with the
array of tax incentives and allowances serving to distort decisions on savings,
investment and production.  Certainly tax arrangements in the housing area are
helping to inflate the bubble even more.  It may be too that Ireland will have to
undertake microeconomic reforms to help enhance its ability to adjust without
the exchange rate/interest rate tools.  In particular, the labour market could be85
made more flexible.  Ireland seems to be moving in the opposite direction
however, with plans to introduce a minimum wage in 2000.
Despite these concerns, the evidence so far suggests that recent strong growth
is not a temporary phenomenon.  The Economic and Social Research Institute
in Dublin expects annual average growth rates of over 4 % until at least 2010,
and in the immediate future, Consensus Forecasts predict growth of 6.7% and
5.6% in 1998 and 1999 respectively.  While these figures represent a decrease
from levels seen currently in Ireland, they are very strong relative to New
Zealand’s growth performance.  This shows the continued importance of strong
fundamentals, and the advantages of location.  It seems that, given careful
management and some prudent reform, Ireland can continue to grow strongly
well into the future.86
12. CONCLUSIONS
So what are the determinants of Ireland’s impressive growth performance?  It
seems that there is no one factor ￿ it is more a constellation of influences.
First of all, Ireland is an English-speaking nation on the edge of a huge
European market.  Their entry into the then EEC in 1973 served to solidify and
further enhance the already open economy.  It also set Ireland up as a prime
investment destination for countries seeking access to the European market,
but who found it easier to do so from an English-speaking country.  This was
particularly so in the case of the US ￿ possibly also because of historical
connections arising from past migration.
Coupled with foreign investment incentives such as special low tax rates and
high-profile country marketing, Ireland’s EU membership and geographic
position attracted reasonably large amounts of capital into the country.  Due to
the investment incentive structure this capital was attracted into high-tech,
export-oriented sectors, which created job opportunities for highly skilled
workers in Ireland and pushed Ireland’s current account into surplus.  Foreign
investment was one of the key drivers of growth and increases in productivity.
Ireland also had the advantage of macroeconomic stability.  Low inflation was
achieved in the mid-1980’s, and the real exchange rate has remained within a
16 point band since 1984.  Both these features were achieved with the help of
membership in the ERM.  In recent years Ireland  has been benefiting from an
exchange rate that is not ‘overvalued’.  Government expenditure reductions
were undertaken in the early and mid-1980’s, and fiscal moderation was
practised with the goal of meeting the fiscal terms of the Maastricht Treaty.  The
complex tax system does not seem to have inhibited growth, although reforms
are now underway to reduce the distortions created by relatively high marginal
tax rates and selective tax allowances.
In the labour market Ireland has experienced high labour force growth due to
favourable demographics.  In particular, Ireland has a young population and has
had increasing female participation, along with rising levels of immigration.
Workers are generally very well educated and highly skilled, and there is an
increasing focus on technical subjects such as engineering and science.
Wages have been restrained by a series of agreements between unions,
employers and the government, although tensions are building now as workers
covered by the agreements seek increases closer to those seen in the non-
unionised sector.  However, the mixture of well skilled, relatively low waged
workers, has enabled the growth of high value-added sectors within the
economy.
Ireland received some assistance from the EU in the form of structural grants
and agricultural support.  This may have promoted some sectors that serve the
agricultural sector, and possibly helped ease the transition from the farm to the87
factory.  It is unlikely that these grants had a large impact on growth, but
nevertheless they had some positive effect.
Lastly, some people talk about the ‘luck of the Irish’.  Perhaps Ireland has been
fortunate to have had investment in sectors where global demand is rising;  to
have had favourable demographics;  to have had the chance to join the EU and
the ERM.  Perhaps they were lucky to have had all their policies ‘come together’
at a time when their markets were growing.
There are issues that Ireland will have to work through in the future, most
imminent is the danger of overheating.  There are also concerns about the
operation of the currency union, the future competitiveness of Ireland, and
structural change.  Yet growth forecasts are bright, both for the short-term and
for the longer-term.
So what can New Zealand learn from Ireland?  We cannot put the country on a
barge and ship it to a position just off the coast of Western Europe; we simply
have to accept our geographical location as a small island on the edge of the
world.  Nor can we do much about our demographic structure, unless
immigration plays a large role in reshaping our population.  Perhaps New
Zealand has to run twice as fast to achieve the same gains as other countries.
We already have low inflation, and have undertaken intensive fiscal reforms.
These were achieved a little later than Ireland however ￿ perhaps the gains
are yet to fully be seen?  The lack of microeconomic reform in Ireland does not
seem to have proved a barrier to growth.  For New Zealand though, following
the ‘run twice as fast’ mentality would suggest that this economy may not get
away with letting issues lapse.  The stable macroeconomic environment may be
something we can learn from though ￿ is a stable exchange rate more
conducive to growth in a small open economy?  Are there different ways of
looking at monetary policy that New Zealand needs to consider?
The quality of factors is also something New Zealand may need to think about.
With foreign investment flowing into Ireland, the quality of investment rose ￿
more emphasis was placed on high-tech, high value-added sectors.  Does the
tax incentive system matter?  Should New Zealand be considering the merits of
a competitive tax regime?  Is our FDI policy a growth-maximising one?  Could
we market New Zealand as an investment destination more effectively?
The quality of labour in Ireland is also high, reflecting their attitudes towards and
investment in education and training.  Should New Zealand be focusing more
strongly on developing workforce skills?  It is unlikely that we can compete on
price for our labour, but surely we can attempt to compete on quality.  What can
we do to our education system to improve the quality of our labourforce?
New Zealand is growing, but according to the OECD we will fall further and
further behind the OECD average if the status quo performance is maintained.
The message is that New Zealand must seriously think about ways to become88
more competitive and more productive.  If we can learn anything from Ireland it
is that our potential is possibly much smaller given our location, and we need to
put a lot of extra effort in to make our economy work better.  That is why we
cannot overlook any possible ways of improving the environment for growth.89
APPENDIX
New Zealand Tax Rates
Data source is HES 1995/96, inflated to 1996/97 by Taxmod, The Treasury.
Average individual tax rate obtained by calculating each individual’s tax as a
percentage of their taxable income and then taking the average of this value
across the population.






1995/95 15 28 33
1996/97 15 24 3390
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